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ABSTRACT

In the first essay titled “Divestitures and Acquisition Probability”, I examine the
relationship between a firm‟s divestiture activities and the likelihood that the firm will
become an acquisition target. Using a logit model comparing a sample of target firms
matched with a sample of non-target firms from 1986 to 2010, we find that a firm is 27
percent more likely to be acquired within three years of a divestiture activity than if there
was no previous divestiture, and the effect is stronger for firms with fewer numbers of
segments. Our finding is robust to modifications of control variables, to managerial
entrenchment, as well as to alternative diagnoses. Consistent with the literature, we find
the market reacts positively to a divestiture announcement. However, cross-sectionally
we find the market reaction is positively related to whether or not the divesting firm
adopts a golden parachute feature and negatively on the firm‟s number of segments
which is related to the probability of future acquisition.
In the second essay titled “The Choice of Divestiture and Long-run Performance:
Asset Sell-off versus Equity Carve-out,” I examine the post-divestiture long-run
performance of two different choices of corporate divestiture, asset sell-offs versus equity
carve-outs, and find that the choice of divestiture method has important implications for
post-divestiture long-run performance. My findings show that the sell-off parents‟ longrun abnormal returns are significantly higher than those of the carve-out parents. I also
find evidence that the long-term abnormal performance improves with a reduction in the
iv

diversification discount. The effect of the diversification discount is weaker for divesting
parents with higher levels of R&D. My results further show that a firm‟s pre-divestiture
number of segments and level of asymmetric information are positively related to the
probability of an asset sell-off.
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DIVESTITURES AND ACQUISITION PROBABILITY

1. INTRODUCTION
Oct 14, 2004: US-based Company BellSouth announced the completion of its
sale of its international assets, three Latin American wireless units, including its
Panamanian and Guatemalan operations, to Spanish carrier TelefónicaMóviles SA.
March 5, 2006: AT&T announce to acquire fellow phone company BellSouth in
a stock deal worth $67 billion, creating a telecommunications giant that dwarfs its
nearest competitor, Verizon Communications.

While prior mergers and acquisitions research has debated whether takeovers
create value overall, there is no debate that target shareholders generally reap large gains
from these transactions. For example, in reviewing 25 studies examining the shareholder
returns in mergers, Bruner‟s (2002) summary of the wealth effects of takeovers shows
that the average two-day cumulative abnormal return for target shareholders around the
merger announcement is around 20 to 30%. 1 Given the highly attractive shareholder
wealth gains associated with becoming a takeover target, managers focusing on the best
interests of their shareholders may have an incentive to take steps to increase the
likelihood of becoming a takeover target. While the above example from the financial
press highlights real world examples of this hypothesis, the existing mergers and
acquisitions literature has not empirically examined the strategic actions firms can take to
make themselves more attractive as possible takeover targets. Does shedding off units
increase the likelihood of being acquired? Prior literature shows that there is a negative
1

See also Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991),
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) among many others.
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relation between diversity and firm value (see Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk
(2002), among others), and other studies argue that diversifying acquisitions destroy
value. If this is the case, then refocusing the firm by reducing the number of segments
may enhance the attractiveness of the firm as a potential takeover target.
We hypothesize that target firms will become more attractive after divesting one
or more segments for several reasons. First, the target‟s size may be relatively large to the
bidders‟, which makes the firm too big to be an easy target. For example, Dietrich and
Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), among others, find that size is negatively related to the
probability that a given firm will be a merger target. One possible explanation is that
several costs associated with a takeover deal increase as the size of the target company
increases. As a result, a smaller size decreases acquisition costs. In addition, the
complexity of the deal also increases when the size of the target gets bigger. Therefore, in
becoming smaller by divesting a unit, the target may have a higher number of potential
bidders. Second, the target might be operating in a number of different segments, some of
which may be of no interest to potential bidders who do not operate in these lines of
business. If they choose to buy the whole target, the post-merger performance of the
combined firm may be worse off because of the acquirer's inexperience in some of the
target‟s business segments. Consequently, the bidder may prefer to buy only segments
that are related to their business. Third, Berger and Ofek (1995) document that the value
of a firm that has more segments will suffer more from a diversification discount.
Therefore, a firm with a higher number of segments will be a less attractive target to
bidders, compared to a firm with a lower number of segments. Fourth, as mentioned
previously, several studies suggest that diversifying acquisitions destroy value. Thus,
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through divestiture, a firm may make a merger more feasible and attractive for bidders
and can potentially increase the likelihood of becoming a target in an acquisition. In this
paper, we conduct several direct tests to examine whether firms that shed off one of their
divisions increase the probability of becoming an attractive takeover target. We further
test whether the hypothesis still holds when a firm divests a segment for different
reasons.
Related to our study, Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1992) investigate the value
created through spinoffs and find that both the spun-off subsidiary and their former
parents subsequently experience a relatively high incidence of takeovers, compared to a
set of control firms match on size and industry. Specifically, they found that out of 131
parents that distributed spinoffs, 18 become takeover targets, compared to seven of their
matched firms. Also, among 146 spinoffs, 21 spinoffs are taken over, compared to five of
their matched firms. However, if managers want to strategically shed off one business
segment and thereby effectively create pure plays for prospective bidders, divestiture via
a subsidiary sale would be a more effective method as opposed to spinoff. Most spinoffs
in the United States are structured as tax-free transactions as in Cusatis et al. (1992).
Under Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, a spinoff maybe structured as a tax-free
transaction only if it satisfies certain requirements, one of which is that neither the parent
nor the subsidiary can be acquired within two years after the spinoff. Violations of this
requirement would trigger an often substantial tax liability at the parent company level
which will significantly lower the premium that target shareholders receive from the
acquisition. As a result, a manager who wants to strategically increase the odds of his
firm being a target would choose a divestiture where the unit is acquired immediately in
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the divestiture, and the parent can be acquired any time after that. While a parent that
conducts a spinoff can be acquired within the two year post-spinoff period, this type of
acquisition would trigger a substantial tax liability which would reduce the gain from
acquisition and make the acquisition less attractive to potential bidders. Therefore, a
manager who wants to strategically increase his firm‟s likelihood of being a target would
be more apt to choose a quicker and more effective method of divestiture, an asset selloff, rather than a spinoff.
In addition to the above, our paper is also different from Cusatis et al. (1992) in
that we provide a more complete multivariate test of our hypothesis using an acquisition
likelihood model as in Palepu (1986), Song and Walkling (2005), and Cai and Vijh
(2007). Cusatis et al. (1992) provides a simple observation of takeover incidence in a
small sample with basic univariate analysis. We provide multiple robustness checks to
make sure the hypothesis holds in different situations. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study that provides a comprehensive multivariate analysis based on a takeover
prediction model to test the hypothesis that firms increase the likelihood of being a
takeover target by engaging in a prior divestiture. The divestiture literature has
highlighted that the market reacts positively to the news that a firm is divesting one or
more segments. The M&A literature clearly shows significant positive shareholder
wealth gains for target firms. However, there may be an important, yet unexplored link
between these two strategic corporate actions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap in
the literature by studying the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of
becoming an acquisition target.
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Our sample consists of 2,256 takeover targets during the period from 1986
through 2010. Using a matched control sample of 2,256 non-target multi-segment firms
(matched by year, industry, size, and book-to-market), we examine the relationship
between a firm‟s divestiture activities and the likelihood that the firm will become an
acquisition target. Our results indicate that such a firm is 27 percent more likely to be
acquired within three years of a divestiture activity than one that did not engage in this
activity. The finding contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on how a
firm‟s strategic restructuring via divestiture activity can increase its likelihood of
becoming a takeover target.
We find that our results hold even after we control for the motives of the
divestiture. A firm may divest a segment for different reasons. For example, a parent firm
may divest one of its segments simply because of financial constraints. It may need cash
to invest in a profitable project, or to expand the current business, or to pay back debt. On
the other hand, it is possible that the firm is not subject to financial constraints, but it
divests a segment strategically to make itself an attractive target for a bid. Controlling for
different possible divestiture motives, our results still hold. That is, the odds of a firm
being acquired after engaging in a prior divestiture activity is significantly higher than
one that did not engage in that activity, regardless of whether or not the firm divests
because it is financially constrained or it wants to invest.
When firms divest, firms that are both financially constrained and have high
growth/investment opportunities (most likely divest to invest or expand production, less
likely to make itself an attractive acquisition target) consistently experience lower
increase in acquisition likelihood compared to firms that neither are financially
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constrained nor have high growth/investment opportunities (least likely divest to invest or
expand production, more likely to make itself an attractive acquisition target). The results
suggest that a firm will have a high chance of receiving a takeover bid when it
strategically divests to make itself an attractive takeover target.
One possible explanation for the increase in acquisition likelihood of divesting
parents may be the cash payment that the divesting parent receives when it sells a
segment. The parent firm can use the cash to retire debt and lower the firm‟s leverage
ratio, which subsequently make the firm a more attractive target. We control for this issue
by examining a sub-sample of divestitures with stock payment. The results (not reported)
still hold using this sub-sample, indicating that a divesting parent will increase its
probability of becoming a target by engaging in a prior divestiture, even in an all stock
payment divestiture. This finding further supports our main hypothesis.
When we propose the main hypothesis, we assume that managers work in the best
interests of their shareholders. However, given the loss of control associated with an
acquisition, managers whose benefits are not aligned with those of shareholders will not
want their firms to be acquired. The threat of dismissal and the loss of income may
encourage the target management to avoid seeking any takeover attempt, regardless of
shareholder interests. In other words, entrenched managers may not want to give up
control of their firms. Jensen (1988) argues that properly constructed severance pay
agreements, termed “golden parachutes”, mitigate the principal-agent conflict between
shareholders and managers and thus will facilitate a successful takeover. Target managers
can agree to a takeover attempt worrying less about loss of jobs, benefits, and income
since their golden parachutes at least compensate them for these losses. We, therefore,
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control for whether or not a firm has the golden parachute feature when it divests. We
also include several management entrenchment proxies in our regressions.
First, research shows that managers‟ benefits are more aligned with shareholders‟
benefits when they own more equity in their companies. Those managers may have an
incentive to take steps to increase the likelihood of becoming a takeover target, given the
highly attractive shareholder wealth gains associated with becoming a takeover target.
For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and Cotter and Zenner (1994) find that
managers with smaller equity stakes are more likely to resist takeover bids. We use
CEO‟s ownership proportion to proxy for the manager‟s incentive to work in the best
interests of his shareholders. Moreover, CEOs around the age of retirement are less likely
to value control, which means they are less likely to impede an acquisition. We therefore
control for CEO age. The results suggest that prior divestiture increases the likelihood of
becoming a takeover target, even after controlling for alternative CEO incentives related
to managerial entrenchment.
We hypothesize that a firm will become an attractive takeover target by engaging
in a prior divestiture activity, because there are benefits (diversification discount) that are
associated with the reduction in the number of business lines in which the firm is
operating. If this is the case, the marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition likelihood
should be smaller for firms that have a higher number of segments as compared to firms
that have fewer segments. Our results indicate that when firms divest, those with a higher
number of segments experience a smaller increase in the probability of becoming a
takeover target as compared to firms with a lower number of segments. More
interestingly, the marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition probability is strongest for
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firms that had exactly two segments prior to the divestiture activity, thus becoming a
single-segment firm after the divestiture.
Song and Walkling (2000) develop and test the “acquisition probability
hypothesis” in which they assert that rivals of initial acquisition targets face an increase
in probability that they will be targets themselves. Therefore, we control for the effect
that an acquisition wave in a firm‟s industry may have on its probability of becoming a
target. We find that the probability of a firm being acquired is significantly higher if the
firm engaged in a prior divestiture activity, even after controlling for the
acquisition ”hotness” of the firm‟s industry.
Consistent with other research, we find that the market reacts positively to the
news that a firm will divest. We find that there is no difference between CARs of
divesting parents that later be acquired within 3 years and parents that are not. Our
abnormal return analysis results show that conditional on the divestiture activity, the
market reacts positively if the divesting firm adopts the golden parachute feature and
reacts negatively if the divesting firm has a higher number of segments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as following: Section II discusses related
literature and develops testing hypotheses; Section III describes sample and data sources;
Section IV presets empirical test framework and results; Section V illustrates the results
from robustness tests; and Section VI concludes.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The extent literature in mergers and acquisitions show that target shareholders
reap the lion's share of gains in merger transactions. For successful and completed
acquisitions, acquirers pay an average premium of 30% over and above the current
market value of the target's shares. For all acquisitions, the target's average abnormal
return on the merger announcement day is around 20 to 30% (see Jensen and Ruback
(1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Andrade,
Mitchell and Stafford (2001) among many others). Given that takeovers tend to be
highly attractive for target shareholders, previous studies have been interested in
identifying factors that can be used to predict acquisition targets. For example, an early
study by Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) analyzes takeover targets in 1968. In comparing
samples of acquired and non-acquired firms based on financial ratios, the authors find
that acquired firms tend to be smaller in size, have lower PE and dividend payout ratios,
and lower equity growth rates. Similarly, Stevens (1973) also concludes that financial
ratios are useful in classifying target firms. He finds that targets are likely to be more
liquid and have a lower level of leverage. Wansley et al. (1983) further finds that targets
generally have less debt, but faster growth and smaller market to book ratios. Consistent
with these finding, Billett (1996) finds that as debt outstanding increases, the likelihood
of being acquired decreases. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) also show that targets are
more likely to have low turnover and smaller dividend payout. Hasbrouck (1986) finds
that non-financial target firms are characterized by low q ratios and a smaller current
liquidity ratio. However, their results indicate that leverage is not a significant factor. In
addition to these above findings, Palepu (1986) also documents that inefficiency, growth9

resource imbalance, and low growth are likely to increase a firm‟s probability of
becoming a target. Using multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), Barnes (1990) finds that
targets in the U.K from 1986 to 1987 have higher liquidity levels but lower profit
margins.

In analyzing the factors associated with takeover probability, Song and

Walkling (2000) provide evidence that the probability of a firm becoming a target is
higher if a rival firm in the same industry was previously acquired. North (2001) finds
that managerial ownership is negatively related to takeover likelihood. Cai and Vijh
(2007) document that higher illiquidity discounts of target CEO holdings is associated
with higher probability of being a target because acquisitions allow target CEOs to
remove liquidity restrictions on stock and option holdings and diminish the illiquidity
discount. Contrary to many older findings in the literature that smaller size is associated
with higher probability of becoming a target, Offenberg (2009) find that larger firms are
more likely to be the targets of disciplinary takeover than smaller firms.
The threat of dismissal and the loss of income may encourage the target
management to avoid seeking any takeover attempt regardless of shareholder interests.
Jensen (1988) hypothesize that “golden parachute” help mitigate the principal-agent
conflict, and therefore, will make a takeover more likely to be successful. Machlin, Choe,
and Miles (1993) test Jensen‟s conjecture and find that the adoption of a golden parachute
is associated with a greater likelihood of a successful acquisition. In addition, Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Wang (2010) report that golden parachutes are associated with increased
likelihood of either receiving an acquisition offer or being acquired. Our study
contributes to this stream of literature by examining whether previous restructuring
activity can enhance the attractiveness of the firm as a takeover target.
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3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Our sample requirements include collecting merger data as well as prior
divestiture data. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from the Securities Data
Company‟s (SDC) U.S Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We screen the data using the
following criteria: (1) The deal value is equal to or greater than $5 million; (2) The
announcement date is from 1986 to 2010; (3) The deal is unconditional and complete; (4)
The acquirer controls 0% of the shares of the target before the announcement date and
controls 100% of the target shares after the effective date; and (5) both the acquirer and
the target are public firms. These criteria result in a sample of 11,199 target firms. We
further require that: (7) the target firms have at least 3 years of financial data on
Compustat in the years prior to the announcement date and (8) the firms have stock price
available in the CRSP database and (9) the firms must be multi-segment ones. The above
screening process leaves us with a sample of 3,477 acquisition target firms. Then we
construct a control sample of non-target firms. Our matching criteria are firm size, book
to market, and industry affiliation, which all are measured as of the end of the fiscal year
prior to the announcement date. In addition, non-target firms in our control sample are
required to meet the requirements (7), (8) and (9) as well. The above procedure leaves us
with a sample of 2,389 acquisition targets and 2,256 non-targets which meet the selection
and data requirements. As shown in Table 1.1, the number of targets varies each year
with a minimum of 15 targets in 2004 and a maximum of 201 targets in 1999. The
highest frequencies of mergers occurred in the late 1990's during the soaring stock market
period.
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Using completed deals involving public acquirers in the SDC database, we obtain
the initial sample of divestiture cases in which the parent company engaged in a
divestiture activity from 1986 to 2010. Applying similar refinement criteria for the same
period, we have the sample of 7356 firms that engaged in divestiture activity during the
period of 1986-2010. We then merge the two databases, where the parent firm in the
divestiture sample subsequently became the acquisition target in the acquisition sample.
We also apply two other requirements: (1) the effective date of the divestiture is before
the announcement date of the corresponding acquisition; (2) the announcement date of
the corresponding acquisition should not exceed 3 years after the effective date of the
divestiture. As shown in table 1.1, this selection procedure yields a sample of 576
(25.5%) target firms that engaged in at least one divestiture activity within 3 years before
being acquired.
We obtain business segment information from COMPUSTAT‟s segment database
and construct a variable named “Number of Segments” which is the number of business
lines, of each target firm in the sample, including those that previously divested and those
that did not. Those non-divestiture firms in the sample have to be multi-segment firms, as
they could have engaged in a divestiture activity.
Summary statistics for the sample of acquisition targets and the control sample of
non-targets are shown in Table 1.2. A comparison of the two groups shows that about
25.5 percent of the targets previously engaged in divestiture while the corresponding
number of the non-target group is only 10.9 percent. Both groups have an average 2.5
number of segments and have similar financial characteristics. However, the targets are,
on average, lower growth firms, which is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishy
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(1990)‟s finding that acquiring growth firms is value destructive to the acquirer. Also, the
targets have lower book to market ratio.
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4. METHODOLOGY
Following Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Song and Walkling
(2005), and Cai and Vijh (2007), we use a logit model to examine the relationship
between divestiture activity and the probability of becoming a subsequent target. P(i,t) is
the probability that a firm i will be acquired in period t, and x(i,t) is a vector measuring a
firm‟s characteristics, and is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.
P (i, t) = 1/[1+e ]
Variables and hypothesis
The vector x contains seven factors, which are frequently used in the prior
literature. The main factor of interest in this study is the divestiture dummy.
X1 = Divestiture dummy: equals one if a firm engaged in a divestiture activity
before the acquisition announcement date.
X2 = Firm size. We expect the takeover probability to be lower for larger firms as
several costs associated with the takeover deal increase as the size of the target company
increases.
X3 = Book to Market (BTM). Low BTM firms are less likely to be targets
because they are relatively “pricey”. However, low BTM firms are firms with high
potential growth, so they may be attractive targets for takeover.
X4 = Profitability, measured as Return on Assets (ROA). The market for
corporate control (Jensen (1986)) supports the argument that takeover is a useful
mechanism to replace managers who fail to maximize shareholder‟s wealth, so poorlyperforming targets may have greater likelihood of acquisition. At the same time, a wellperforming target may be perceived as having more value to the bidder.
14

X5= Leverage. High debt ratio suggests lower potential debt capacity. Firms with
high leverage are less likely to be targets.
X6 = Liquidity. Firms with high liquidity are expected to be more attractive as
takeover targets.
X7 = Growth, measured as the sales growth rate of a firm. Acquiring growth firms
is value destructive to the acquirer according to Morck, Shleifer and Vishy (1990). At the
same time, a rapidly growing firm may be attractive to bidders.
The dependent variable in the logistic regressions will take the value of one if a
firm is an acquisition target and zero if that firm is not a target. The matching sample is
selected as follows: we downloaded all the firms on COMPUSTAT, and then exclude
those firms that were targets in the M&A database. For each year, we sort each firm into
different industries by taking the first two digit numbers of the firm‟s SIC code, and
within each industry, further sort firms into deciles based on size (measured by firm‟s
market value). Each target firm in the sample is matched with one non-target multisegment firm within the same industry, whose market capitalization and book-to-market
ratio in the year prior to the merger were closest in the same deciles.
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5. RESULTS
The regression results of the logit model are shown in table 1.3. The variable of
interest is a divestiture dummy that takes the value of one if a firm engaged in a prior
divestiture and takes the value of zero otherwise. The regression includes other
independent variables corresponding to the hypotheses discussed in part 4.
The odds estimates of the logit model and their associated z-value are presented in
model (1) of table 1.3. We also include the likelihood ratio index as well as the likelihood
ratio statistic. The coefficient for the divestiture dummy variable is statistically
significant and has the expected positive sign. The economic significance is not trivial.
The marginal effect coefficient of the divestiture dummy variable, calculated at the mean
value of vector X, is 0.27, and it is significant at the 1% level of confidence. In other
words, the odds of a firm being acquired is 27 percent higher for firms that previously
divested than for firms that did not engage in this activity, after controlling for other firm
characteristics. This finding provides support for our main hypothesis which predicts that
firms that engaged in a prior divestiture would increase the probability of becoming an
attractive takeover target in a subsequent acquisition. The coefficient on book-to-market
variable is also positive significant which means “pricey” firms are less likely to be
targets. The results also show that growth is negatively associated with takeover
probability, which means firms with high growth rate are less likely to be acquisition
targets. Other coefficients are not statistically significant.
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6. DIAGNOSTICS
In this section, we check the robustness of our hypothesis that divestitures
increase the probability of becoming a target in an acquisition. First we control for a
firm‟s management entrenchment as it can strongly affect the firm‟s likelihood of being a
target. We then check whether the finding above is changing with the reasons why a firm
may divest. Next, we add firms‟ number of segments to the regression, addressing the
concern that the marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition probability would be smaller
for firms with a higher number of segments. Then we control for merger and acquisition
waves, as Song and Walkling (2002) find that when a firm is acquired, it increases the
probability that other firms in the same industry are acquired.

A. Management Entrenchment
One possible concern with the results presented in table 1.3 is a firm‟s
management entrenchment can affect the likelihood that the firm will become an
acquisition target. Jensen and Ruback (1983) talk about the takeover market where
different management groups compete for the rights to direct the allocation of the firm‟s
assets. This means simply that if one manager thinks he can use the assets of a firm better
than another, he simply acquires the firm and removes the manager. This type of takeover
is also seen in a proxy fight, where a large shareholder attempts to takeover the firm.
Managers battle for the rights of the corporation where the winner controls the hiring,
firing, and compensation decisions. This market for corporate control helps to regulate
the labor of top management, like other competitive jobs would be fought for. In our
main hypothesis, we assume that the agency problem is not severe and managers may
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work in the best interests of their shareholders. However, given the loss of control
associated with a takeover, managers whose benefits are not aligned with those of
shareholders may not want his firm to be acquired. The threat of losing control and
income may prevent the target management from seeking any takeover attempt regardless
of shareholder interests.
Jensen (1988) conjectures that a golden parachute may reduce the principal-agent
conflict between share-holders and managers and thus will facilitate a successful
takeover. Target managers can agree to a takeover attempt without worrying about loss of
jobs, benefits and income since their golden parachutes at least compensate them for
these losses. Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010)
both document that golden parachute adoption is associated with an increased likelihood
of successful acquisition. Thus, we control for whether or not a firm has the golden
parachute feature when it divests.
In addition, research shows that managers‟ benefits are more aligned with
shareholders‟ when their ownership proportion is higher. Those managers may have an
incentive to take steps to increase the firm‟s likelihood of being a target, given the highly
attractive shareholder wealth gains in an acquisition. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1988), and Cotter and Zenner (1994) document that managers with higher equity
stakes are less likely to resist to takeover bids. We use CEO‟s ownership proportion to
proxy for the manager‟s incentive to work in the best interests of his shareholders.
Furthermore, CEOs who are at retirement age may be less likely to value control,
and thus, may be less likely to resist to an acquisition. Weisbach (1988) finds that a
nontrivial number of resignations take effect on the CEO‟s sixty-fifth birthday and these
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resignations are likely to be actual retirements, unrelated to performance. In addition,
Goyal and Park (2002) also mention that turnover of CEOs around age 65 are more likely
due to normal retirements than to forced departures. Jenter and Lewellen (2011) study the
impact of target CEOs‟ retirement preferences on the incidence of takeover bids and find
evidence that the likelihood of an acquisition increases sharply when the target CEO
reaches age 65. We, therefore, include an CEO age dummy variable that takes the value
of one if a firm‟s CEO age is equal to or older than 64 (in our sample, the average time
between a firm‟s divestiture announcement date and the time it receives a bid is 1 year)
and takes the value of zero otherwise. Moreover, Weiback (1988) reports that the median
tenure for CEOs who resign from outsider-dominated and insider-dominated firms are 9
and 7.5 years, respectively. Goyal and Park (2002) find that the median tenure is equal to
7 in their sample. If a CEO has been in place for 7 years, it may be more likely that he
will leave the current positive and, therefore, will be less likely to resist an acquisition.
On the other hand, the length of time a manager holds the CEO position may imply he is
an “entrenched” manager. We control for the CEO tenure effect by including a tenure
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm‟s CEO tenure is equal to or greater
than 6 and zero otherwise.
Five additional logit models are presented in table 1.3. In model (2), golden
parachute is positively related to the probability of becoming a target, significantly at the
5% level of confidence. We use the CEO age and ownership dummy variables in models
(3) and (5) to control for the CEO entrenchment level. We include all these variables in
model (6). The divestiture dummy variable is still statistically significant and has the
expected positive sign in all these models. Thus, the results provide evidence that prior
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divestiture increases the likelihood of becoming a takeover target even after controlling
for alternative CEO incentives related to managerial entrenchment.

B. Reasons of divestiture

While the preceding results support the view that divestiture activity is positively
related to the probability of subsequently becoming a target, the findings could be biased
if the motives behind a divestiture are not carefully examined. A firm may divest for
different reasons. One reason for divestiture may be financial constraints. For example, a
firm that engaged in a prior divestiture may be in need of cash to pay back debt, or to
invest, expand production when it is financially constrained. That is, it has positive
investment projects but at the same time, is constrained by large amount of debt relative
to its optimal leverage and thus, may raise funds for its investment projects by engaging
in a divestiture activity. Several studies indicate that asset sales are used as a method of
generating cash when the firm is financially constrained. Schlingemann, Stulz, and
Walking (2002) find that the divestiture announcements are often preceded by a period of
poor operating performance. Furthermore, Ofek (1993) finds that firms with high
leverage are more likely to sell assets. Officer (2007) finds that firms that engaged in
divestiture activity have lower cash balances and cash flow.
On the other hand, a firm may divest strategically to make itself an attractive
acquisition target. If a firm divests because it is financially constrained and needs to pay
back debt, would the effect on acquisition probability still hold? If a firm sells a
subsidiary to invest, will this change the likelihood that the firm will become an
acquisition target? To address these different motivations, we re-estimate the regression
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in model (1) of table 1.3, controlling for firms‟ financial constraints and investment
opportunities in the fiscal year before the divestiture activity. We use the cash balance
and cash flow, both scaled by total asset, leverage ratio, operating performance
(measured as net income plus depreciation scaled by book value of assets), and coverage
ratio (defined as EBIT divided by interest expense ) as proxies for a firm‟s financial
constraint. We use the growth rate in sales and growth in capital expenditure to proxy for
the growth and investment opportunities the firm may have in the following year. We
then re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a
target if the firm is financially constrained. We also re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s
divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a target if the firm is growing fast and may
have positive investment projects. The break point is the industry-median.
Five different pairs of regressions are presented in Panel A of table 1.4. In each
pair, we re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a
target using two sub-samples of target firms that are more likely to be financially
constrained and target firms that are more likely to be exempt from that problem. The
first column in each pairs is re-estimated regressions of model (1) in table 1.3 on target
firms that are more likely to be financially constrained: low operating performance, low
cash balance, low cash flow, high leverage and low interest expense coverage. The
second column in each pairs is re-estimated regression of model (1) in table 1.3 on target
firms that are not likely to be financially constrained: high operating performance, high
cash balance, high cash flow, low leverage and high interest expense coverage.
In all these regressions, the coefficients for the divestiture dummy variable are
statistically significant and have the expected positive sign. However, the marginal effect
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of divestiture in the even columns is consistently higher than those of the odd columns.
The results provide evidence that supports the following two conclusions. First, the odds
of a firm being acquired after engaging in a prior divestiture activity is significantly
higher than one that did not engage in that activity, whether or not the firm is financially
constrained. Second, the results support our hypothesis that a firm may divest
strategically to make itself an attractive acquisition target. In all regressions, if the firm
divests not because it is financially constrained, the increase in likelihood of being a
target is consistently higher. This finding provides support for our hypothesis, which
predicts that a firm that engaged in a prior divestiture will increase its likelihood of being
a takeover target in an acquisition, regardless of the motive of the divestiture.
Two different pairs of regressions are presented in Panel B of table 1.4. In each
pair, we re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a
target using two sub-samples of target firms that are more likely to have growth and/or
investment opportunities and target firms that are less likely to have. The first column in
each pairs is re-estimated regressions of model (1) in table 1.3 on target firms that high
growth and investment opportunities. The second column in each pairs is re-estimated
regressions of model (1) in table 1.3 on target firms that are not likely to have growth or
investment opportunities. In all these regressions, the coefficients for the divestiture
dummy variable are statistically significant and have the expected positive sign. However,
the marginal effect of divestiture in the even columns is consistently higher than those of
the odd columns. The results provide evidence that supports the following two
conclusions. First, the odds of a firm being acquired after engaging in a prior divestiture
activity is significantly higher than one that did not engage in that activity, whether or not

22

the firm divests to invest. Second, the results support our hypothesis that a firm may
divest strategically to make itself an attractive acquisition target. In all regressions, if the
firm divests when it does not have growth or investment opportunities, the increase in
likelihood of being a target is consistently higher. This finding provides support for our
hypothesis, which predicts that a firm that engaged in a prior divestiture will increase its
likelihood of being a takeover target in an acquisition, regardless of the motive of the
divestiture.
We provide a robustness check in panel C of Table 1.4. We re-estimate the effect
of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a target on three different subsamples of target firms: firms that are both financially constrained and have high
growth/investment opportunities (most likely divest to invest or expand production, less
likely to make itself an attractive acquisition target); firms that either are financially
constrained or have high growth/investment opportunities, but not both; and firms that
neither are financially constrained nor have high growth/investment opportunities (least
likely divest to invest or expand production, more likely to make itself an attractive
acquisition target). The results are consistent with our hypothesis. In all these regressions,
the coefficients for the divestiture dummy variable are statistically significant and have
the expected positive sign. However, the marginal effect of divestiture is increasing from
model (1) to model (3). That is, a firm will have a high chance of receiving a takeover bid
when it strategically divests to make itself an attractive takeover target.

23

C. Number of segments

We hypothesize that a firm will become an attractive takeover target by engaging
in a prior divestiture activity, because there are benefits (diversification discount) that are
associated with the reduction in the number of business lines in which the firm is
operating. If this is the case, it is likely that the effect should be smaller for the firm that
operates in many segments as compared to another firm that operates in a few segments.
For example, if there are two firms with similar financial characteristics, both engaging in
a prior divestiture, a firm with a higher number of segments (i.e.,5 segments) should
experience a smaller increase in the probability of becoming a takeover target as
compared to another firm with a lower number of segments (i.e., 2 segments).
Furthermore, diversification discount theory predicts that diversified firms tend to be
valued at a discount as compared to focused firms. Therefore, we predict that the
likelihood of a firm being acquired should be negatively related to its number of business
segments when it divests a segment.
In model (1) of table 1.5, we provide a test for the effect of a firm‟s number of
segments on its likelihood of being a target in an acquisition if the firm engaged in a prior
divestiture. We re-estimate the regression in model (1) of table 1.3, adding the interaction
variable between the divestiture dummy variable and the firm‟s number of segments. The
regression also includes other independent variables corresponding to the hypotheses
discussed in part 4.
The results provide strong support for our hypothesis. The marginal effect of the
divestiture dummy variable, calculated at the mean value of vector X, is 0.31 and it is
significant at the 1% level of confidence. In other words, the probability of a firm being
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acquired is 31% higher if the firm engaged in a prior divestiture activity. This is the
marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition probability for firms that had exactly two
segments prior to the divestiture activity, thus becoming a single-segment firm after the
divestiture. The coefficient on the interaction variable is statistically significant and has
the expected negative sign. It means that a firm‟s likelihood of being a target in an
acquisition would be lower for each increment in the firm pre-divestiture number of
business segments. For example, a firm with five segments when divest will increase its
likelihood of being an acquisition target and that likelihood is equal to two-third the
likelihood that a divesting firm with only two segments. This result strongly supports our
hypothesis. In addition, including the interaction variable does not take away the power
of the divestiture dummy variable.

D. Acquisition trend
Song and Walkling (2000) develop and test the “acquisition probability
hypothesis” in which they assert that rivals of initial acquisition targets face increased
probability that they will be targets themselves. Therefore, we control for the effect that
an acquisition wave in a firm‟s industry may have on its probability of becoming a target.
Specifically, for each firm in the regression sample, we include an industry “hotness”
measure, which is the number of acquisitions in the target industry within the past year. If
our main hypothesis is true, then including this variable should not alter the result found
above.
In model 2 of table 1.5, we re-estimate our main regression, adding a industry
“hotness” variable which is measured as the number of acquisitions in the target industry
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within the past year. The result shows that the number of acquisitions in a firm‟s industry
during the last one year is not related to its probability of being an acquisition targets.
The divestiture dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. In other words,
the probability of a firm being acquired is significantly higher if the firm engaged in a
prior divestiture activity, controlling for the acquisition ”hotness” of the firm‟s industry.
Thus, the increased probability of takeover following a divestiture is not driven by
acquisition waver within the industry.

E. CAR analysis

In table 1.6, for each of the firms that engaged in a prior divestiture activity in our
final sample, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns during several period
windows around the divestiture announcement date. The cumulative abnormal returns
were estimated using the market model for two groups of firms that engaged in
divestiture activity: firms that subsequently become a target in an acquisition within three
years from the divestiture date, and firms that do not. Consistent with the literature, we
find that the market reacts positively when firms divest, regardless of whether they
become a target later on or not. However, in panel A, the t-statistic test shows no
difference in CARs for these two groups of firms around the announcement date for all
the estimated windows.
In panel B, we reports the coefficients from multivariate regressions of CAR (-2,
+2) on a set of independent variables that seem to affect the acquisition likelihood.
Conditional on the divestiture activity, if the firm has the golden parachute feature, the
market reaction is higher (4%) than if there is no golden parachute provision in place.
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Similarly, the positive reaction is weaker for firms that have a higher number of segments.
We interpret the results as evidence that golden parachutes increase, and number of
segments mitigate, the acquisition probability when a firm divests.
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7. CONCLUSION
Given the attractive wealth gains that takeovers provide for target firm
shareholders, identifying factors that can affect the probability of takeover has been a
topic of interest not only to academic researchers but to investors as well. Real world
examples suggest that firms may take strategic actions to make themselves more
attractive as potential takeover targets. We empirically address this issue by examining
whether a firm that engaged in a divestiture activity will increase its likelihood of being
acquired in a takeover. Based on logit models using a sample of 2,256 target firms and a
matched sample of 2,256 non-target firms, we estimate the increase in probability that a
firm becomes a target in an acquisition by engaging in a prior divestiture. Our evidence
shows that a firm that engaged in divestiture activity is 27 percent more likely to be
acquired within three years of the divestiture than one that did not engage in this activity.
The results are statistically significant and robust to modifications of the model based on
alternative divestiture motives and managerial incentives.
We also find evidence that even though the market reacts positively when a firm
divests, the level of reaction depends on whether the divesting firm adopts the golden
parachute feature and on the firm‟s number of segments.
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Table 1.1 Sample distributions by year
This table reports the total number of target firms in year of the sample period, as well as subsamples of targets that
did and did not engage in a prior divestiture.

Divestiture

Total target firms

Event year Frequency
1986
142
1987
133
1988
129
1989
91
1990
34
1991
28
1992
20
1993
33
1994
75
1995
114
1996
105
1997
151
1998
153
1999
201
2000
164
2001
106
2002
52
2003
58
2004
15
2005
85
2006
99
2007
95
2010
70
2009
40
2010
63
Total
2256

Percent
6.3%
5.9%
5.7%
4.0%
1.5%
1.2%
0.9%
1.5%
3.3%
5.1%
4.7%
6.7%
6.8%
8.9%
7.3%
4.7%
2.3%
2.6%
0.7%
3.8%
4.4%
4.2%
3.1%
1.8%
2.8%
100.00%

Yes
No
Total

Target
576
1680
2256

Non-Target
246
2010
2256

Targets that did not divest Targets that divested

Frequency
129
113
105
70
24
24
14
26
50
80
77
116
109
147
116
76
42
41
2
58
66
65
44
36
50
1680
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Percent
7.7%
6.7%
6.3%
4.2%
1.4%
1.4%
0.8%
1.5%
3.0%
4.8%
4.6%
6.9%
6.5%
8.8%
6.9%
4.5%
2.5%
2.4%
0.1%
3.5%
3.9%
3.9%
2.6%
2.1%
3.0%
100.00%

Frequency
13
20
24
21
10
4
6
7
25
34
28
35
44
54
48
30
10
17
13
27
33
30
26
4
13
576

Percent
2.3%
3.5%
4.2%
3.6%
1.7%
0.7%
1.0%
1.2%
4.3%
5.9%
4.9%
6.1%
7.6%
9.4%
8.3%
5.2%
1.7%
3.0%
2.3%
4.7%
5.7%
5.2%
4.5%
0.7%
2.3%
100.00%

Divestiture/
Target
by year
9.2%
15.0%
18.6%
23.1%
29.4%
14.3%
30.0%
21.2%
33.3%
29.8%
26.7%
23.2%
28.8%
26.9%
29.3%
28.3%
19.2%
29.3%
86.7%
31.8%
33.3%
31.6%
37.1%
10.0%
20.6%
25.5%

Table 1.2 Summary statistics
This table presents means and differences in means for the target firms and their benchmark firms. The sample
contains 2256 target firms from 1986 to 2010. Divestiture is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target
firm engaged in divestiture activity within a three year-time frame prior to the acquisition announcement and zero
otherwise. Number of segments is the firm‟s number of different business lines. Size is measured as the logarithm of
the firm‟s market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. Book to market is the ratio of book value to
market value of equity. Return on assets is net income divided by the book assets. Leverage is the book value of
total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Growth is measured by
the change in sales. Statistical significance of the mean difference is based on the t-test and is denoted with ***, **,
and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively.

Variables
Divestiture
Number of
segments
Size
Book to Market
Return on Assets
Leverage
Growth
CEO age

N

Target (1)

Benchmark (2)

Difference
(1) - (2)

2256

0.255

0.109

0.146

<0.0001***

2208

2.43

2.48

-0.05

0.1*

2256
2256
2170
2254
2234
452

5.14
0.74
-0.02
0.178
0.307
55.5

5.09
0.69
-0.02
0.183
0.387
55.2

0.05
0.05
0.00
0.005
0.08
0.3

0.42
0.002***
0.72
0.78
0.05**
0.55
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p-Value

Table 1.3 Divestitures, management entrenchment and acquisition likelihood

Management Entrenchment
Model
Divestiture
Size
Book to market
ROA
Leverage
Liquidity
Growth

(1)
0.27
(11.91)***
-0.002
(0.3)
0.042
(2.96) ***
-0.02
(0.66)
0.00
(0.81)
0.03
(0.96)
-0.03
(2.26) **

Golden Parachute

(2)
0.24
(7.16) ***
-0.004
(0.56)
0.023
(0.52)
-0.13
(1.27)
0.002
(1.04)
0.026
(1.21)
-0.09
(1.52)
0.07
(2.3) **

(3)
0.25
(7.25) ***
-0.007
(0.36)
0.05
(0.39)
-0.015
(0.30)
-0.005
(0.32)
0.4
(0.06)
-0.007
(1.54)

CEO Age >=64

(4)
0.23
(6.61) ***
-0.003
(0.17)
0.005
(0.16)
-0.064
(0.15)
0.037
0.35
0.04
0.32
-0.16
(1.02)

0.03
(1.82) *

CEO tenure

0.06
(1.79) *

CEO ownership
Control for year
Control for Industry
No of observation
Likelihood ratio
index
Likelihood ratio
statistic

(5)
0.26
(2.64) **
-0.04
(0.17)
0.05
(0.21)
0.3
(0.28)
-0.09
(0.24)
0.01
(1.08)
-0.15
(0.42)

Yes
Yes
3796
0.03

Yes
Yes
784
0.06

Yes
Yes
752
0.06

Yes
Yes
692
0.06

0.013
(1.65) *
Yes
Yes
312
0.09

145.23

138.76

113.25

115

37.24

(6)
0.22
(6.55) ***
-0.001
(1.08)
0.076
(0.25)
0.017
(0.53)
-0.04
(0.23)
0.08
(0.47)
-0.21
(1.14)
0.06
(1.96)**
0.04
(1.55)
0.12
(0.44)

Yes
Yes
634
0.06
56.22

This table reports the odds obtained from estimating logistic regression models of acquisition likelihood. Also
reported are the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of
one if the firm is a target in a completed acquisition and zero otherwise. This is a logit regression on 2256 target
firms that were acquired during the period 1986-2010 and 2256control non-target firms that are matched based on
year, industry, market to book and size. For each target firm, in the year of the acquisition, we randomly select a
control firm from COMPUSTAT that operates in the same industry (using the first two digits SIC code
classification) and has the market capitalization and market to book in the same deciles. The independent variables
are defined details in table 1.2. Divestiture is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target firm engaged in
divestiture activity within a three year-time frame prior to the acquisition announcement and zero otherwise.
Number of segments is the firm‟s number of different business lines. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s
market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. Book to market is the ratio of book value to market
value of equity. Return on assets is net income divided by the book assets. Leverage is the book value of total debt
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divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Liquidity is defined as the sum of
cash balance and short-term investment over the total asset. Growth is measured by the change in sales. Golden
parachute is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm employs this governance feature as reported by IRRC.
CEO age dummy takes values of one if the CEO is older than 63 and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is a dummy
variable that takes value of one if the number of years that the CEO has held the chief executive office is greater
than or equal to 6 and takes value of zero otherwise. CEO ownership is the number of shares owned by the CEO as a
fraction of shares outstanding. T-values are reported in the parentheses and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%,
5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4 Divestiture motivations and acquisition likelihood
Panel A: Financial distress
Sample
Model
Divestiture
Size
Book to market

Operating
Performance
(1)
(2)
Low
High
0.19
0.33
***
(5.78)
(10.18) ***
-0.01
-0.02
(1.53)
(2.39) **
0.04
0.03
**
(2.03)
(1.36)

ROA
Leverage
Liquidity
Growth
Control for year
Control for
Industry
# of obs
Likelihood ratio
index
Likelihood ratio
statistic

-0.11
(0.54)
0.11
(1.20)
-0.005
(1.21)
Yes
Yes

-0.04
(0.66)
-0.07
(0.66)
0.02
(0.48)
Yes
Yes

2096
0.04
110.2

Cash Balance
(3)
Low
0.25
(8.66) ***
-0.002
(0.8)
0.03
(1.98) **
0.15
(2.38) **
-0.004
(1.47)

(4)
High
0.31
(8.81) ***
-0.01
(1.4)
0.04
(1.95) *
-0.004
(0.09)
-0.08
(1.53)

Cash Flow
(5)
Low
0.22
(6.85) ***
-0.02
(2.36) **
0.04
(2.13) *
-0.04
(0.96)
0.00
(1.1)

(6)
High
0.32
(10.41) ***
-0.02
(2.87) ***
0.04
(1.77) *
-0.12
(0.91)
0.00
(0.97)

Leverage
(7)
High
0.24
(8.28) ***
0.01
(1.36)
0.02
(1.28)
0.03
(0.69)

(8)
Low
0.29
(7.41) ***
-0.02
(2.04)
0.04
(1.07)
0.01
(0.21)

Coverage ratio

-0.04
(0.65)
-0.02
(1.17)
Yes
Yes

(9)
Low
0.24
(6.62) ***
0.01
(1.49)
0.03
(1.19)
0.02
(0.3)
-0.00
(0.32)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.03
(1.87) *
Yes
Yes

(10)
High
0.29
(8.66) ***
-0.01
(1.03)
0.05
(1.58)
-0.06
(0.42)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.03
(0.43)
-0.01
(0.82)
Yes
Yes

-0.007
(0.63)
Yes
Yes

-0.01
(1.34)
Yes
Yes

-0.01
(1.26)
Yes
Yes

-0.02
(1.01)
Yes
Yes

0.06
(0.94)
-0.01
(1.42)
Yes
Yes

2092
0.04

2190
0.03

2102
0.04

1888
0.03

2368
0.04

2036
0.03

1786
0.03

1410
0.04

0930
0.03

111.49

88.89

91.92

69.39

113.02

82.39

58.23

64.24

80.03
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Panel B: Investment and growth opportunities
Sample
Model
Divestiture
Size
Book to market
ROA
Leverage
Liquidity
Growth
Control for year
Control for Industry
# of obs
Likelihood ratio
index
Likelihood ratio
statistic

Investment Opportunities
(1)
(2)
Low
High
0.29
0.22
***
(5.78)
(6.29) ***
-0.001
-0.003
(1.53)
(0.33)
0.02
0.06
(2.03) **
(2.71) ***
-0.09
0.07
(1.29)
(1.57)
0.09
-0.00
(0.54)
(1.51)
0.05
-0.02
(1.20)
(0.36)
-0.01
-0.00
(1.21)
(1.11)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1944
1740
0.04
0.03
91.36

49.28
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Growth Opportunities
(3)
(4)
Low
High
0.27
0.24
***
(8.76)
(7.18) ***
-0.02
-0.01
(2.39)
(1.47)
0.01
0.05
(0.7)
(2.35) **
0.11
-0.02
(1.27)
(0.49)
-0.09
0.06
(1.73) *
(0.97)
0.05
0.09
(0.77)
(1.35)

Yes
Yes
2112
0.03

Yes
Yes
1710
0.03

85.11

67.53

Panel C: Divestiture motivation and acquisition Likelihood

Sample
Model
Divestiture
Size
Book to market
ROA
Leverage
Liquidity
Growth
Control for year
Control for Industry
# of obs
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio
statistic

Financial Distress
and High Investment
Opportunities

Financial Distress or
High Investment
Opportunities

(1)
0.19
(3.89) ***
0.01
(0.76)
0.07
(2.4) **
-0.01
(0.19)
-0.08
(0.97)
0.06
(0.73)
-0.005
(1.02)
Yes
Yes
845
0.03
24.02

(2)
0.22
(7.73) ***
0.001
(0.27)
0.04
(2.23) **
0.01
(0.34)
-0.08
(1.38)
0.02
(0.38)
-0.004
(1.22)
Yes
Yes
2568
0.03
79

Non- Financial
Distress and Low
Investment
Opportunities
(3)
0.33
(8.14) ***
-0.01
(1.4)
0.04
(0.96)
-0.2
(0.90)
-0.06
(0.67)
0.03
(0.38)
-0.06
(1.37)
Yes
Yes
1162
0.05
72.92

This table reports the odds obtained from estimating logistic regression models of acquisition likelihood.
Also reported are the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value of
one if the firm is a target in a completed acquisition and zero otherwise. This is a logit regression on 2256
target firms that were acquired during the period 1986-2010 and 2256 control non-target firms that are
matched based on year, industry, market to book and size. For each target firm, in the year of the
acquisition, we randomly select a control firm from COMPUSTAT that operates in the same industry
(using the first two digits SIC code classification) and has the market capitalization and market to book in
the same deciles. The independent variables are defined in details in table 1.2. Divestiture is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if a target firm engaged in divestiture activity within a three year-time
frame prior to the acquisition announcement and zero otherwise. Number of segments is the firm‟s number
of different business lines. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s market value of equity at the end
of the previous fiscal year. Book to market is the ratio of book value to market value of equity. Return on
assets is net income divided by the book assets. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the sum
of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Liquidity is defined as the sum of cash
balance and short-term investment over the total asset. Growth is measured by the change in total asset.
Cash is the cash balance, and cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Coverage ratio
is defined as EBIT divided by interest expense. Operating performance is measured as net income plus
depreciation scaled by book value of assets. Growth opportunities and investment opportunities are defined
as the growth in sales and the growth in capital expenditures in the year t-1. T-values are reported in the
parentheses and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5 Other robustness checks

Model
Divestiture
Divestiture * # of segments

No of segments

Acquisition Trend

(1)
0.31
(7.52) ***
-0.04
(1.67) *

(2)
0.27
(11.59) ***

# of acquisitions
Size
Book to market
ROA
Leverage
Liquidity
Growth
Control for year
Control for Industry
No of observation
Likelihood ratio index
Likelihood ratio statistic

-0.02
(0.43)
0.04
(1.96) *
0.09
(0.90)
-0.001
(0.96)
0.018
(0.39)
-0.013
(1.84) *
Yes
Yes
3820
0.03
145.61

0.006
(0.49)
-0.001
(0.17)
0.04
(2.31) ***
0.006
(0.17)
-0.07
(1.57)
0.04
(0.80)
-0.01
(1.27)
Yes
Yes
3392
0.03
144.21

This table reports the odds obtained from estimating logistic regression models of acquisition likelihood.
Also reported are the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value of
one if the firm is a target in a completed acquisition and zero otherwise. This is a logit regression on 2256
target firms that were acquired during the period 1986-2010 and 2256 control non-target firms that are
matched based on year, industry, market to book and size. For each target firm, in the year of the
acquisition, we randomly select a control firm from COMPUSTAT that operates in the same industry
(using the first two digits SIC code classification) and has the market capitalization and market to book in
the same deciles. The independent variables are defined in details in table 1.2. Number of segments is the
firm‟s number of different business lines. Number of acquisitions is calculated in the firm industry within
the past year. T-values are reported in the parentheses and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and
10% rejection levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6 CAR Analysis
Panel A
Cumulative Abnormal Return at Divestiture announcement date
Divested, target firms
Divested, non-target firms
Variables
N
MEAN
t-value
N
MEAN
t-value
***
CAR (-2,0)
482
1.9%
3.49
206
2%
2.44**
CAR(-2,+2)
482
2.3%
3.23***
206
2.1%
2.9**

Difference
t-stat
1.03
1.09

Panel B
Variables
Growth

CAR(-2,+2)
0.02
(0.46)
0.04
(1.47)
-0.01
(2.48) **
0.04
(3.71) ***
0.001
(1.61)
0.005
(1.14)
785
3.28
0.14

Leverage
Number of segments
Golden Parachute
CEO Ownership
CEO Age
No of obs
F-Statistic
R-Square

Panel A shows the average cumulative abnormal returns of the 2 groups of firms around the divestiture
announcement date. The first group includes firms that divested and then became acquisition targets within
3 years from the divestiture date. The second group includes firms that divested but were not acquired
within 3 years from the divestiture date. Panel B reports the coefficients from multivariate regressions of
CAR (-2, +2) on a set of independent variables that seem to affect the acquisition likelihood. T-values are
reported and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively
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THE CHOICE OF DIVESTITURE AND LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE:
ASSET SELL-OFF VERSUS EQUITY CARVE-OUT

1.

INTRODUCTION

The sale of a subsidiary is a major corporate breakup decision, which may enable
a firm to refocus on its core business, to pay off debt, to do research and development on
new products, or to finance attractive projects. A parent firm can choose to completely
divest the subsidiary by directly selling it to an acquirer. Alternatively, it can choose to
sell its subsidiary partially via an equity carve-out, where it sells shares of the divested
subsidiary to the public and retains a portion, which is often significant and represents
controlling ownership of its subsidiary. During the 1970-2006 period, asset sell-offs
account for an average of 38% M&A (source: Mergerstat Review). Meanwhile, the total
market value of carve-outs has an annual average of above $32 billion during the 19852007 period, with a peak of $80 billion in 1993 (source: SDC).
There are an extensive number of studies that look at the stock price reaction of
divesting firms around the announcement dates. They have highlighted that equity carveouts and sales of subsidiaries to acquirers have important shareholder wealth effects for
parents at the time of the divestiture announcement. For example, Jain (1985), Hite,
Owers, and Rogers (1987), John and Ofek (1995), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Dittmar
and Shivdasani (2003), and Slovin et al. (2005), among others, all report that
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announcement returns of asset sell-offs are generally positive for selling parents.
Similarly, Schipper and Smith (1986), Slovin et al. (1995), Allen and McConnell (1998),
Vijh (1999), and Mulherin and Boone (2000) show that the parents of equity carve-outs
experience positive and significant abnormal announcement returns. However, there has
been limited research on the post-divestiture long-term performance of the divesting
parents.
John and Ofek (1995) look at asset-sell-off parents‟ long-run operating
performance and they find evidence that asset sell-offs lead to an improvement in the
post-divestiture operating performance of the parent over a period of three years. This
increase mainly occurs in firms that increase their levels of focus. Dittmar and Shivdasani
(2003) also document that diversified firms that divest a business segment would
experience a reduction in the diversification discount after the divestiture, resulting from
an improvement in the efficiency of investment for remaining divisions. However, the
difference between the long-run returns of the divesting parents that choose different
methods of divestiture has not received the same degree of scrutiny as the short-run
effects of this decision. Furthermore, the factors that influence the choices of divestiture
methods are largely unknown. In this paper, I explore the post-divestiture long-run
performance of asset sell-off parents and equity carve-out parents and investigate the
characteristics that lead to the choice of divestiture method.
I conjecture that asset sell-off parents will outperform the carve-out parents in the
long-run following a divestiture activity for three reasons. First, asset sell-off parents will
experience a higher increase in degree of focus than equity carve-out parents, which will
lead to a better operating performance in the long-run. While the whole subsidiary is
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divested in an asset sell-off, the parent company often retains a controlling interest in an
equity carve-out. Allen and McConnell (1998) report that the median retention rate is
about 80%, while Vijh (2002) finds that parent firms often maintain 72% ownership of
the carve-out unit. In addition, the mean (median) number of segments of U.S firms is
relatively small, about 2.5 (3) (Source: Compustat Segment Database). For a carve-out
parent that maintains a majority control over its carve-out unit, it is unlikely that the
transaction will change the level of focus or the breadth of managerial responsibility of
the parent‟s managers. Therefore, the difference between the asset sell-off parents and the
equity carve-out parents is that the carve-out parents, on average, will have a substantial
amount of overall remaining equity stake and therefore, more likely to have their levels
of focus unchanged, which is important economically and may contribute to the
difference in long-run performance between the two groups of divesting parents.
Second, a manager whose interest is not highly aligned with that of shareholders
will be reluctant to sell-off assets because his compensation is related to the size of the
firm he manages (Allen and McConnell (1998)). The agency prospect comes into play
because there is a separation between ownership and control. When an assets sale is
required to maximize shareholder wealth, an incumbent entrenched manager will prefer
to sell a minority stake in a subsidiary, maintaining assets under control. In support of
this argument, Schipper and Smith (1986) provide evidence on manager‟s reluctance to
relinquish control of the carve-out unit. They report that in the majority of cases, the CEO
of the carve-out unit is also the manager of the parent company. Therefore, I argue that
the managers of carve-outs are more likely to be entrenched than the managers of selloffs, ceteris paribus. Many studies have documented that entrenched management may be
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attributed to a decrease in firm‟s value. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
empirically investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm valuation. Their
results indicate that firms with higher G index values, which reflect weaker shareholder
rights and more entrenched management, have significantly lower firm value than those
with lower G index values. Similarly, Bekchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) construct an
entrenchment index and also document a negative impact of managerial entrenchment on
firm value. Therefore, I expect that the long-run operating performance and stock excess
returns of carve-out parents would be somewhat below those of asset sell-off parents,
ceteris paribus.
Third, in asset sell-off the subsidiary is completely sold to an acquirer so the size
of the equity under the control of the parent firm‟s manager gets smaller. Therefore, the
principal-agent problem may be reduced through an asset sell-off. On the other hand, the
principal-agent problem is less likely to be reduced in an equity carve-out in which the
managers often maintain controlling interest over the subsidiary. I expect that the
reduction in principal-agent problem may be another reason for the better performance in
long-run of asset sell-off parents.
My paper differs from the previous studies above in that I examine the difference
in the performance between asset sell-off parents and equity carve-out parents in each of
the three years following the divestiture. John and Ofek (1995) only study the long-run
performance of asset sell-off parents and Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) only look at the
change in the diversification discount in one year. In addition, the positive announcement
returns for divesting parents indicate that divestitures generally create value for divesting
parents. There are three alternative explanations that are well-documented in the literature
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for this value creation: the increase in corporate focus, the elimination of negative
synergies, and a better fit with the buyer. John and Ofek (1995) attribute the increase in
the divesting firm‟s value to the increase in the firm‟s level of focus. My approach tests
and expands John and Ofek (1995)‟s hypothesis. If a divestiture creates value through an
increase in corporate focus, which reduces the firm‟s diversification discount, I expect
that the long-run performance of parent firm in a complete divestiture (reduce number of
segments and more likely to increase level of focus) should be significantly higher than
that of parent firm of a partial divestiture (less likely to increase level of focus).
My paper is also different from John and Ofek (1995) in that they only measure
long-run operating performance. In addition to operating performance, I also examine
long-run stock excess returns using three different methods: market-adjusted returns,
non-event control firm matched by industry, size, and B/M; and a calendar time analysis
using the Fama-French 3-factor plus momentum model. My 1983 to 2005 sample
encompasses their 1986-1988 period, and is 6 times larger.
I also contribute to the literature by considering an alternative explanation to the
diversification discount. For example, firms with substantial research and development
expenses (high R&D firms) may not suffer as much from a diversification discount. This
is due to the fact that the diversification discount may be partly offset by the benefit from
R&D inputs that can be shared among different segments in diversified firms and thus,
may benefit less from the divestiture. I find that the effect of the diversification discount
reduction on long-run performance is weaker for those firms. In examining the long-run
buy-and-hold abnormal performance of the carve-outs, Vijh (1999) finds that all
measures of long-run abnormal returns of carve-out units are insignificantly different
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from zero. The study also reports that eighteen out of twenty measures of long-run excess
returns of carve-out parents are negative but insignificant. However, the study focuses on
explaining the results of carve-out units‟ performance and does not provide an
explanation for the performance of the carve-out parents. Thus, given the existing
evidence, I attempt to fill a gap in the corporate restructuring literature by examining the
difference in performance of parent firms that choose to divest via an asset sell-off versus
an equity carve-out. In comparing the post-divestiture performance of parents, I also
examine factors that influence the differences in performance based on the divestiture
choice.
I analyze a sample of 868 asset sell-off transactions that occurred between 1983
and 2005, and compare them to 162 equity carve-outs identified in the same period. I find
that asset sell-off parents experience higher long-run operating performance and higher
long-run stock excess returns than equity carve-out parents. This difference is robust to
different approaches for measuring long-run abnormal returns. The results indicate that
the strong post-divestiture performance may be the outcome of the reduction in the
diversification discount. Firms that increase their focus as a result of their asset sales or as
a result of their carve-outs (in which the parents have to relinquish its majority control of
their subsidiaries) experience higher operating performance and higher stock long-run
excess returns than firms that do not increase their focus.
I also find that the effect of the reduction in diversification discount on the longrun performance is weaker for parent firms that have high research and development
expenses. This finding supports my hypothesis that for high R&D firms, an increase in
focus, and therefore diversification discount reduction, may not be as beneficial as for
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low R&D firms. A possible explanation is that in high R&D firms, the diversification
discount may be mitigated as each additional unit receives benefit from a central research
and development budget. Similar to my finding, Aggarwal and Zhao (2009) find that in
some cases, the diversification discount does not hold. They argue that diversified firms
should outperform single segment firms in industries with higher external transaction
costs, (for example, industries where there is a severe problem of information asymmetry,
industries where the exercise of control rights in resource shifting is difficult, and
emergent high-tech industries). They contend that the finding of diversification discount
depends on the firm‟s relative balance between external transaction costs and internal
transaction costs.
Furthermore, I examine the initial market response to divesting parents and find
evidence that the positive market reaction to the divestiture announcement is smaller for
the high R&D divesting parents. This finding provides further support for the view that
high R&D firms are less vulnerable to the diversification discount.
In addition, I examine the factors that drive the choice of divestiture method. My
empirical findings show that parent firms‟ number of segments, a proxy for the firms‟
level of focus, is positively related to the probability of the asset sell-off choice. Firms
with higher asymmetric information levels are more likely to follow the sell-off option.
The results also illustrate that when a firm divests an unrelated unit, it is more likely to
choose the asset sell-off method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. In the next section, I review
the related literature and present my testable hypotheses. In section 3, I present the
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sample selection procedure and data description of the divestiture samples. Section 4
presents and analyzes empirical results of the hypotheses. I summarize and conclude in
section 5.
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2.
A.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

Literature Review
Many studies have examined the stock price reaction of divesting firms around

the announcement date. These studies typically find that announcement returns are
generally positive for asset sell-off parents (e.g., Jain (1985), Hite, Owers, and Rogers
(1987), John and Ofek (1995), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Dittmar and Shivdasani
(2003), and Slovin et. at. (2005)) as well as for equity carve-out parents (e.g., Schipper
and Smith (1986), Slovin et. al. (1995), Allen and McConnell (1998), Vijh (1999), and
Mulherin and Boone (2000)). However, the post-divestiture long-term performance of the
divesting parents has attracted limited attention. John and Ofek (1995) find that the
operating profitability of the asset sell-off parents increases after a divestiture, but only
for the firms that become more focused. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) examine the
investment efficiency of divesting parents and find that the asset sales are associated with
a significant reduction of the diversification discount. They suggest that the investment
policy for remaining divisions becomes more efficient after the divestiture. Vijh (1999)
estimates long-term abnormal stock returns for both parents and carve-out subsidiaries
and finds that these returns are insignificantly different from zero using a variety of
benchmarks. However, the study focuses on the possible explanation for the performance
of carve-out units and does not provide an explanation for the results of the carve-out
parents.
In this paper, I examine the differences in the long-run performance of carve-outs
parents versus asset sell-off parents. I also attempt to explain that the determinants that
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influence firms‟ decisions over two divestiture methods may have important implications
for the differences in the long-run performance of the two parent groups.
In examining divestiture choice, several studies have attempted to identify factors
that may influence a firm‟s choice over different divestiture methods. For example, Khan
and Mehta (1996) find that a subsidiary with higher operating risk is divested through a
spin-off and the one with lower operating risk is divested through a sell-off. Maydew,
Schipper and Vincent (1999) study the impact of taxes on the decision to divest assets via
a taxable sale rather than via a tax-free spin-off.
The underlying motivations behind the firm decision to divest through a spin-off
or through an equity carve-out have been explored in many studies. Shaw and Michaely
(1995) compare determinants that may affect the choice between carve-outs and spin-offs
of Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs). They find that spinoff units tend to be smaller
and less profitable than carve-out firms. Frank and Harden (2001) extend Shaw and
Michaely (1995) and find more information about firms‟ choice between carve-outs and
spin-offs using a larger and more diverse sample of firms where the parents divest
subsidiaries other than MLPs. They find that cash constraints, marginal tax rates,
subsidiary profitability and the growth potential of the subsidiary‟s industry are
significant factors associated with the two divestiture methods.
While studies have examined different factors that may affect divestiture choices,
factors that influence the choice between two methods of divestiture, asset sell-off and
equity carve-out, has received less attention. A possible reason is that asset sell-offs and
equity carve-outs are more similar, compared to spin-offs, since they both represent a
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major change in corporate structure, ownership structure, and they both generate positive
cash flow to the parent firms.
A related study by Powers (2001) studied the determinants that affect firm‟s
choice among the three divestiture mechanisms (equity carve-out, spinoff, and asset selloff). They conclude that the parent‟s need for external financing and managerial
incentives may be factors that determine the divestiture method. However, those factors
mainly influence a firm‟s decision over choosing between a spinoff and the other two
methods of divestiture. These factors are not as relevant in influencing a firm‟s decision
to conduct an equity carve-out or a sell-off. For example, they find that both asset sell-off
and equity carve-out parents (who receive cash) have higher leverage and also have
worse operating performance than spin-off parents, suggesting they need more external
capital than spin-off parents. In addition, they argue that managers who value private
benefits and compensation will not favor the spin-off method over the other two
divestiture methods, because spin-offs generate no cash and reduce the size of the firm. In
this paper, I provide further analysis of the divestiture method choice by identifying
factors that influence the two more closely-related types of divestiture methods: carve-out
versus sell-off.
B.

Testable Hypotheses
i.

Long-run Performance
Because an asset sell-off will completely separate the unit from its parent, this

divestiture method is more likely to reduce the firm‟s number of segments and increase
the firm‟s level of focus. As a result, the firm will benefit from the reduction of its
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diversification discount. On the other hand, the equity carve-out is not an effective
method of increasing focus because the parent often retains a controlling interest and the
divested unit is more likely to be related. Therefore, it may not get much benefit from the
reduction of diversification discount. I hypothesize that the long-run performance of
parents, measured both in operating and stock performance, following selloffs would be
higher than that of carve-out parent, because of the difference in their diversification
discount reduction.
Hypothesis 1a: The long-run operating performance of asset sell-off parents is
significantly higher than the long-run operating performance of equity carve-out parents.
Hypothesis 1b: The long-run abnormal stock returns of asset sell-off parents are
significantly higher than the long-run abnormal stock returns of equity carve-out parents.
ii.

Diversification discount exception
If the diversification discount helps to explain the better performance of parents in

asset sell-offs versus carve-outs, then the difference in performance based on divestiture
choice should be less evident for parent firms that are less vulnerable to a diversification
discount. For example, firms with substantial research and development (high R&D
firms) do not suffer as much from a diversification discount, and thus, should benefit less
from the divestiture since they did not have as much of a diversification discount in the
first place. Following Aggarwal and Zhao (2009), one possible explanation is that in high
R&D firms, the diversification discount may be reduced by the benefit that each
additional unit receives from a central research and development expenditure as R&D
inputs can be shared among different segments in diversified firms. I expect the effect of
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focus increasing (diversification discount reduction) on long-run performance to be
weaker for those firms. On the other hand, low R&D parents may benefit more from the
divestiture since they can reduce their diversification discount to a greater extent.
Hypothesis 2: High R&D firms do not suffer as much from a diversification
discount, and thus, should benefit less from a divestiture in their long-run performance.
iii.

R&D effect on the market reaction at divestiture announcement dates.
If high R&D firms do not suffer as much from a diversification discount, and

thus, benefit less from a divestiture, I expect different immediate market reactions on
divestiture announcement dates for firms with different levels of research and
development intensity. Specifically, I predict that firms with a higher level of R&D
expenses would experience lower announcement abnormal returns, while firms with
lower level of R&D expenses would receive higher announcement abnormal returns.
Hypothesis 3: The divestiture announcement excess returns are negatively related
to the parent firm‟s level of research and development.
iv.

Level of focus
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that a reduction in a firm‟s level of diversification, or

in other words, an increase in its level of focus, may contribute to an increase in its value.
Because asset sell-offs result in a complete separation between the parent and its
subsidiary, this divestiture method increase the parent firm‟s level of focus (and
consequently increase value through the reduction of diversification discount) when the
divested unit is an unrelated one. Therefore, I predict that an asset sell-off will be more
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likely to be the choice when a firm divests an unrelated business segment. On the other
hand, in equity carve-outs, where only a partial of the divested unit is sold and the parent
often retain a controlling interest over the unit, equity carve-out is preferred to asset selloff when the parent divests a related unit because of the benefits gained from synergy
when the divested unit is operating in industries that are related to the parent‟s main
operations. Also, because a parent that maintains majority control over its carve-out
subsidiary is less likely to be able to focus more on its core operations, equity carve-out is
not an effective method of increasing focus and may not provide much benefit from the
reduction of the diversification discount. Therefore, I expect that parent firms that have a
greater need for a focus-increasing transaction are the ones that will not opt for the equity
carve-out method.
Hypothesis 4: The asset sell-off is more likely to be chosen over the carve-out
method for unrelated subsidiary and for parent firms with low pre-divestiture level of
focus.
My measurements for level of focus include three variables: the total number of
non-trivial (at least accounted for 10% of the total sales) business segments reported by
the firm, the sales-based Herfindahl Index, and the asset-based Herfindahl Index across
the firm‟s business segments. A higher number of business segments indicates a lower
level of focus and Higher Herfindahl Index indicates a higher level of focus. I expect that
when a firm divests, the probability that it will choose the asset sell-off method over the
carve-out method is positively related to its pre-divestiture number of segments and
negatively related to its pre-divestiture Herfindahl Indexes. I use two dummy variables to
indicate whether the divested unit is related to its parent‟s core business. Relate2 and
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Relate3 each takes the value of one when the divested division and the parent are both
operating in related industries (they share the same two or three digit SIC code) and zero
otherwise.
v.

Level of information asymmetry
Firms with high levels of asymmetric information may find capital markets

difficult to access because of strict SEC disclosure requirements. In particular, a firm that
wants to carve-out its unit has to file a prospectus in which it analyzes and discloses the
carve-out‟s financial viability. In addition, it is more costly for firms with high
asymmetric information to send a signal of its true value to the public market. Therefore,
the buyer‟s ability to value the assets being divested plays a critical role in the parent
firm's decision on the method to divest. In support of this prediction, John and Ofek
(1995) show that three-quarters of divested segments are unrelated to the parent‟s core
business (using four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code) in asset sell-offs.
Since public investors are usually not well-informed about the divested unit's value and
may not have expert knowledge of the carve-out unit‟s business, they are less likely to
subscribe to an equity carve-out when asymmetric information of the parent firm is high.
In support of this argument, Ellingsen and Rydquist (1997) argue that a manager who has
negative information about a firm‟s prospect is less likely to go public. Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1999) find that, because in an IPO, the firm sells shares to a larger number of
investors, those investors must be convinced about the value of the firm. On the other
hand, an acquirer in an asset sell-off can value the assets better than the majority of
public investors because they may operate in the same industry or they are willing to
incur some costs to gather information about the asset they intend to buy. Therefore, I
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expect that firms that have high asymmetric information and are more difficult to value
will be more likely to divest via the sell-off method. In contrast, firms that are more
easily valued by public investors are more likely to divest via an equity carve-out.
Hypothesis 5: A parent firm‟s pre-divestiture level of information asymmetry is
positively related to the probability that it will choose the asset sell-off method over the
carve-out method when it divests.
I use two sets of variables to measure a firm‟s level of asymmetric information.
One set is constructed based on its financial characteristics. It includes the firm‟s size and
the ratio of intangible assets over total assets. I hypothesize that the higher the values of
intangibles assets relative to total assets, the more uncertain a large set of investors will
be regarding the value of the firm‟s total assets as well as the value of its subsidiary
assets. In this case, a firm may find it easier to persuade one buyer about its subsidiary
asset value in an asset sell-off than to persuade a larger set of investors in an equity
carve-out. Also, I expect that information about larger firms is generally more available
to public investors than smaller firms.
I also proxy for asymmetric information based on analysts‟ earnings forecast data
from the I/B/E/S History Summary File. The more analysts that follow a firm, the more
information is generated leading to less asymmetric information. I expect that a firm‟s
pre-divestiture degree of analyst coverage is negatively related to the probability that it
will choose the asset sell-off method over the carve-out method when it divests. In
addition, analysts‟ forecast errors (as a proxy for level of inaccuracy) and forecast
dispersion (as a proxy for analyst uncertainty) are widely used in the literature (e.g.,
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Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Kang and Liu (2008), and Aggarwal and Zhao
(2009), among many others) as measures of a firm‟s information environment. I calculate
analyst earnings forecast error (FE) as the absolute value of the difference between mean
earnings forecast and actual earnings, divided by the price per share at the end of the
month in which earnings information is released. I define analyst earnings forecast
dispersion (DISPER) as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the price
per share at the end of the month in which earnings information is released. Both
variables FE and DISPER are expected to be positively related to a level of information
asymmetry. Therefore, I predict that when a firm divests, its pre-divestiture measures of
analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion are positively related to the probability that
it will choose the asset sell-off over the carve-out.
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3.

DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION

I select two subsamples: an asset sell-off parent sample and an equity carve-out
parent sample. The subsample of firms that divest via asset sell-off is obtained from the
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, and the subsample of firms that divest via
equity carve-outs is drawn from the SDC Global New Issues database. An acquisition is
classified as an asset sell-off if the acquired target is a subsidiary, division, or branch of
another firm at the time of the acquisition announcement. An initial public offering is
classified as an equity carve-out if the issuing firm is a subsidiary of another firm at and
before the time of the offering. I examine divesting transactions over the period of 19832005. For both types of deals, I exclude all transactions in which the deal value (for asset
sell-off transactions) or the proceeds (for carve-out transactions) is $100 million or lower.
I impose this size requirement to ensure the transaction is economically significant and to
make the two samples comparable, because if the size of a divested unit is too small, the
divesting parent may have no option but to divest this asset through an asset sell-off.
In order to be included in my sample, I further require three more screening
criteria. First, I require that each divesting parent in the sample has at least 2 consecutive
years of financial data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices and from
Compustat. I collect financial and accounting variables for each divesting parent at the
end of the year prior to the transaction from Compustat. I exclude firms if they are
missing data for total assets, sale (revenue), total liabilities, net cash flow, or short-term
debt. Market values of equity and abnormal returns around the transaction time are
retrieved from CRSP. Second, the deal value and the percentage of shares acquired must
be available in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. Third, the proceeds and the
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percent being spun off have to be available on SDC Global New Issues database. Analyst
earnings forecasts, actual earnings and number of earning forecasts data are obtained
from I/B/E/S History Summary File. Segment information is obtained from Compustat‟s
Segment database. My final sample of corporate divestiture consists of 868 asset sell-offs
and 162 equity carve-outs.
The distribution of equity carve-outs and asset sell-offs in my sample over time
and among industries is shown in table 2.1. I follow the Fama-French 17 industry
classification procedure. I observe a higher frequency of divesting events among parent
firms operating in food, oil and petroleum, drugs, machinery, transportation, utilities,
finance and retail stores. Within my sample period, the highest frequency of transactions
happens in the year 2000 (86 transactions), 2005 (73 transactions), 1999 (71 transactions),
and 2004 (68 transactions), mostly influenced by the number of asset sell-off transaction
in those years. The rest of the transactions are evenly distributed among other years. I
also provide the market values of the divested unit in both the asset sell-off sample and
the equity carve-out sample. I measure the market value of the carve-out unit as the
proceeds amount of the issue, divided by the percent of issuer/subsidiary that is being
sold in the equity carve-out. The market value of the sell-off unit is measured by the total
value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses, divided by the
percentage of shares acquired in the transaction. The average and the median market
value of the asset sell-off units in my sample are $429 million and $472 million,
respectively. On the other hand, the average and the median market value of the equity
carve-out units in my sample are $655 million and $564 million, respectively. Both the
average and median market value of a unit being carved-out in my sample is higher than
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those of a unit being sold-off. However, in most of the years they are comparable and the
difference is not economically significant.
Table 2.2 describes the proportion of the divested units compared to the divesting
parent firms. On average, the asset sell-off units account for about 18.6% of their parent
market values while the carve-out units account for 21.3% of their parent market values.
However, their median values are about the same, which are about 33.6% and 31.1% for
the two groups, respectively. As shown in this table, firms sell about one-fifth to onethird of their total assets in the average transaction.
This table provides the mean of accounting, financial, and other firm-specific
variables that are expected to have an influence on the divestiture method for equity
carve-outs parents as well as asset sell-offs parents. Variables are collected for each
divesting parent at the fiscal year end proceeding the year in which the transaction
occurs. In general, the mean values suggest that divesting firms in both samples are not
significantly different in basic financial characteristics. They are comparable in marketto-book ratio, have similar leverage as well as operating margins. In addition, their
research and development expenses are similar to each other, both are around 2.5% of
their total assets; their divested units both account for about one-fifth of the parent‟s total
assets.
On average, asset sell-off parents have a higher number of business segments
(2.95) prior to the divestiture activity compared to carve-out parents (2.48). The
difference between the pre-divestiture numbers of segments of the two parent groups is
statistically significant at a 5% level of confidence. The result is consistent with
Hypothesis 4 as I expect that firms with a higher number of business lines should suffer
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more from the diversification discount and, therefore, should have a greater need for a
focus-increasing transaction. Therefore, they are more likely to choose the asset sell-off
method. In addition, both the pre-divestiture sales-based Herfindahl Index average (0.58)
and the assets-based Herfindahl Index average (0.59) for the asset-sell-off parents are
significantly (at 10% level of confidence) smaller than those of the carve-out parents
(0.69). Table 2.3 also shows that the mean values of Relate2 and Relate3 (equals to one if
the divested unit and the parent share the same two or three digit SIC code) for asset selloff transactions are 0.33 and 0.22, respectively, which are significantly lower than their
mean values of equity carve-out transactions (0.44 and 0.3, respectively).
I also report statistics for different measurements of the parent firms‟ asymmetric
information level in table 2.3. The average number of analyst coverage for the asset selloff parents is 10, which is significantly lower than the analyst coverage of 12 for the
carve-out parents. The mean values of earnings forecast error and earnings forecast
dispersion variables of the asset sell-off parents are all significantly higher than those of
the carve-out parents at a 1% level of confidence. In addition, the intangible asset ratio of
the asset sell-off parents is 14.9%, which is significantly higher (at a 1% level of
confidence) than the 8.9% ratio of the equity carve-out parents. Finally, table 2.3
indicates that the market values of the carve-out parents are higher than the market values
of the asset sell-off parents.
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4.
A.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Post divestiture long-run performance of Parent Firms in Equity Carve-out and
Asset Sell-off
In this section, I examine the ex-post performance of the parent firms in asset sell-

off and equity carve-out samples. If parent firms opt for a complete separation via a selloff when the benefit from a focus increasing transaction is higher, then I expect that the
long-run abnormal performance of the asset sell-off parent firms should be higher than
that of the equity carve-out parent firms. The difference in long-run performance may
result from a decrease in the diversification discount as a result of having a fewer number
of segments. I measure both the divesting parents‟ long-run operating performance as
well as their long-run stock returns. I use three different approaches for measuring the
long-run abnormal stock returns of a divesting parent. First, the long-run excess return of
a firm is calculated as the geometric stock return for the firm minus the CRSP valueweighted return (I also report the result using CRSP equally-weighted return) during the
same period. Second, I compute the long-run abnormal stock return as the mean
difference in the stock price performance between the event-firm‟s and non-event
benchmark firm‟s buy-and hold over periods that extend from 1 to 4 years. I select a nonevent benchmark firm using the following matching criteria: size, market-to-book, and
industry affiliation. Third, I measure long-run abnormal stock returns using the FamaFrench (1993) three factor plus momentum model, using weighted least square method to
estimate the parameters of the model. This methodology is recommended in Fama (1998)
and then used by Longhran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Liu,
Szewczyk and Zantout (2008) to measure long-term abnormal returns. In all three
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different approaches, I exclude the returns in the month of event announcement dates.
The exclusion is justified in Vijh (1999).
i) Operating Performance
I, following John and Ofek (1995), and Boone et al. (2003), compare the return on
assets of two divesting parent groups, measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, and
depreciation (EBITDA) to book value of assets, to test whether there is a significant
difference between the profitability of asset sell-off parents versus equity carve-out
parents. In the year of the divestiture, results of the divested units are not reflected in the
parent‟s EBITDA, but are reported separately in the financial statements. I calculate the
difference in returns on assets between asset sell-off parents and equity carve-out parents
in the divestiture year, year zero, and examine how this difference changes in years 1, 2,
and 3. I expect that the change in the difference between two groups of divesting parents‟
long-run operating performance may be the result of different divestiture method choices.
Table 2.4 shows that in year 0, the asset sell-off parents are performing equally to
the equity carve-out parents. In general, an asset sell-off parent becomes significantly
more profitable in each of the three years following the divestiture, even after adjusting
by the firm‟s industry median operating performance. On the other hand, an equity carveout parent either experiences negative return on assets or insignificant return, adjusting
by the median return on assets in the parent firm‟s industry. More importantly, the
difference in operating performance between the two divesting parent groups is
statistically significant for all three years following the divestiture. Furthermore, this
result is not due to biases based on differences in performance for the two parents‟
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industries. The results in table 2.4 support Hypothesis 1a that asset sell-off parents have
higher operating performance than equity carve-out parents.
ii) Stock Price Performance
a. The excess return method
Table 2.5 reports the long-term average excess return (AER) over periods that
extend from 1 to 3 years following the divestiture events. The excess return (ER) for each
event firm is calculated as the geometric return for the firm minus the CRSP valueweighted return for the same period. As shown in table 2.5, I find statistically significant
negative post-announcement abnormal stock returns to the equity carve-out parent firms
over the second year, the third years and over the 3-year period. These findings are
consistent with the finding in Vijh (1999). I also find statistically significant positive
post-announcement abnormal stock returns to the asset sell-off parent firms over the
second year, the third year and over the 3 year period. From year 1 to year 3, the long-run
abnormal return to the asset sell-off parents are always statistically higher than that of the
carve-out parents. This finding is consistent with my Hypothesis 1b in section II that asset
sell-off parent firms have higher benefits, compared to carve-out parents, from focus
increasing transactions and therefore, have higher long-run abnormal returns than equity
carve-out parent firms.
b. The matching method
In this method, I compute the long-run abnormal stock return of an asset sell-off
(equity carve-out) parent firm and then compare its stock price performance to that of a
matched firm over the holding periods. I use the following matching criteria: (1) firm
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size; (2) industry affiliation; and (3) book-to-market ratio. I select the matched firm as the
one with the closest book-to-market ratio from the list of non-event firms operating in the
same industry. From this group, I choose the firm with a the market value of equity that is
between 60% and 140% of that for the event firm as of 1 month before the announcement
date. None of the matched firms sell-off (carve-out) its unit during the period from 3
years before to 3 years after the event date. When a matched firm is delisted before the
end of the holding period, the next best matched firm is substituted on the delisting date.
After matching the equity carve-out (asset sell-off) parent firms with non-event
benchmark firms, I follow Barber and Lyon (1997) to calculate the holding period
abnormal return for a firm as:
BHARi,a,b= ∏bt=a (Ri,t+ 1) - ∏bt=a (Rm,t +1),
where BHARi,a,b represents the excess return for event firm i over the time period
from month a to month b, Rit is the return of event firm i on month t, and Rmt is the return
of the matched firm on month t. I compute the buy-and-hold average abnormal returns
(BHAAR) over holding periods that extend from 1 to 4 years. None of the buy and hold
periods include the month of the announcement date. If an event firm is delisted before
the end of a buy-and-hold period, its truncated return series is still included in the
analysis, and it is assumed to earn the monthly return of the bench mark for the remainder
of the period. The statistical significance of each of the BHAR is tested using the
parametric t-test (two tailed), based on the cross-sectional standard deviations.
Table 2.6 describes the post-announcement buy and hold average stock returns
using the matching method. Consistent with the results obtained from the excess return
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method, I find statistically significant negative post-announcement buy-and-hold
abnormal stock returns to equity carve-out parent firms over the periods of 3 years and 4
years. Meanwhile, I find statistically significant positive post-announcement buy-andhold abnormal stock returns to asset sell-off parent firms over the periods of 2 years, 3
years and 4 years. These abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 5% level or
1% level. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the asset sell-off parents are always
significantly higher than those of the equity carve-out parents. The difference in long-run
abnormal performance between the two divesting samples accumulates from 16% over a
2 year period to about 33% over the 4 year period. The results of table 2.6 strongly give
support to Hypothesis 1b.
c. The rolling portfolio method
I estimate the post-announcement long-run abnormal returns for equity carve-out
(asset sell-off) parent firms using the rolling portfolio method, which is recommended in
Fama (1998) and used by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and
Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout (2008). For every calendar month, I compute the equally and
value-weighted returns on the portfolio of all firms that carve-out (sell-off) their units
during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. Then, I use the calendar time
event-portfolio returns in the following Fama and French (1993) three factor model plus
momentum factor to estimate the abnormal return of the rolling portfolio:
Rp,t– Rf,t= αp + βp (Rm,t– Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpUMDt +ep,t,
where Rp,t represents the return on the event portfolio in the month t; Rf,t is the 1month U.S. Treasury bill rate in month t; Rm,t is the return on the valued-weighted index
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of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed stocks in month t; SMBt is the difference
between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the NYSE
median value) with the same weighted average book-to-market value of equity ratio in
month t; HMLt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low bookto-market value of equity ratio (above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 fractiles) with about the
same weighted average size in month t; and UMDt is the difference between the returns
on up and down return portfolios that mimic the momentum risk factor. The intercept αp
is then interpreted as the average monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across
all 24, 36 or 48 months.
Because the number of asset sell-off (equity carve-out) parent firms that are
included in the rolling event portfolio changes over time, I use the weighted least squares
(WLS) methods to estimate the four factor model‟s parameters. The weights I use in the
WLS model are the number of event firms in the monthly portfolio. The rolling portfolio
returns are calculated both equally and value-weighted using the market values of the
firms in the rolling portfolio as of the end of the month before the event date as the
weighting vector. I have 274 calendar month portfolio return observations, as the
sampling period is from March 1983 through December 2005.
Table 2.7 presents the post-announcement average abnormal monthly stock return
estimated using the rolling portfolio returns and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
plus momentum model. I estimate returns as the value-weighted average of returns of
firms in the rolling portfolio. I find most of the measures of post-announcement abnormal
stock returns to the equity carve-out parent firms over the periods from 2 to 4 years are
negative, although generally insignificantly different from zero. The long-run stock
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abnormal returns become positive over the periods of 3 and 4 years if portfolio returns
are calculated using the value weighted method. On the other hand, I find that seven out
of eight measures of the post-announcement abnormal stock returns to the asset sell-off
parent firms are positive and significantly different from zero over the periods of 1 year,
2 years, 3 years, and 4 years. Consistent with my other measures of long-run
performance, the differences between the long-run excess returns of these two groups of
parents are always positive and significant, yielding further support Hypothesis 1b.
B. Regression Analysis of the Post-announcement Long-term Buy-and-Hold
Abnormal Returns
The above results indicate that the long-run performance of asset sell-off parent
firms is significantly higher than that of the equity carve-out parent firms in most of the
models. One reason may be that many asset sell-offs result in an increases in the parent
firms‟ level of focus, which in turn leads to a reduction in its diversification discount. In
this section, I make an effort to see whether this increase in focus can explain the results I
find in part A of this section. To explore this issue, I model the post announcement buyand-hold abnormal return of divesting parent firms (both asset sell-off parents and equity
carve-out parents) as a function of explanatory factors, including a Focus dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if there is an increase in the parent firm‟s level of focus
following the divestiture event (unrelated asset sell-off and relinquish-control unrelated
equity carve-out) and zero otherwise. In explaining the difference in post-divestiture
performance of carve-out and sell-off parents, one may argue that part of what may be
driving the long-run performance, in addition to the increase in level of focus, is the postdivestiture activities of the parent firms. For example, the parent firm may become an
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acquirer. If this is the case, then the firm‟s long run performance will be affected as many
studies have documented that acquirers generally suffer from negative long-run abnormal
returns. Therefore, I control for whether a parent firm became an acquirer within a year
after the divestiture. I include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
divesting parent becomes an acquirer within one year after the divestiture and zero
otherwise. I also control for the relative size between the subsidiary and its parent
because as the size of the subsidiary increases relative to its parent, the diversification
discount may decrease even more, resulting in better long-run performance.
In regression1 of table 2.8, the coefficient on the asset sell-off dummy variable is
positive significant at the 5% level of confidence. The multivariate result is consistent
with the findings in previous tables and supports my hypothesis that asset sell-off parents
experience higher long-run returns than parents of equity carve-outs. In regression 2 of
table 2.8, the coefficient on the focus dummy variable is significant and positive at the
10% level. This finding indicates that for transactions that result in an increase in the
firm‟s corporate focus, the divesting parent firms‟ long-run buy-and-hold abnormal stock
returns are 22% higher than those of divesting parent firms in transactions that do not
experience such an increase, regardless of whether the transaction is an asset sell-off or a
carve-out. Therefore, one reason for the better long-run performance of parents following
sell-offs, as opposed to carve-outs, may be their reduction in the diversification discount
that is associated with a higher level of focus.
I further explore this issue by examining Hypothesis 2 to see if the parent firm's
pre-divestiture level of R&D expenses can affect its long-run abnormal performance.
Perhaps higher R&D parent firms do not benefit as much from the sell-off since they did
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not suffer as much of a diversification discount in the first place. In those high R&D
firms, the marginal R&D benefits that each additional unit gets from central R&D may
outweigh the marginal R&D costs associated with having one additional unit. Therefore,
in those firms, the net gain from R&D of each additional unit may compensate for part of
the loss from diversification discount of each additional unit. Regression 3 tests this
hypothesis by including an interaction variable between the focus dummy and the highR&D dummy. I expect the effect of focus-increasing (diversification discount reduction)
on long-run performance should be weaker for those high R&D firms. I find that the
coefficient on the interaction variable in regression 2 is significant and negative at a 10%
level of confidence. In support of Hypothesis 2, this finding suggests that high R&D
firms do not suffer as much from a diversification discount, and thus, benefit less from
the sell-off. Also, I do not find evidence that divesting parents that become acquirers
following a divestiture significantly underperform those who do not engage in that
activity.
C. Regression Analysis of the Divestiture Announcement Abnormal Returns
Because the results in table 2.8 indicates that high R&D firms do not benefit
much in the long-run following a divestiture because they may not suffer as much from a
diversification discount in the first place, I expect stronger market reactions at divestiture
announcement dates for divesting parents with lower levels of R&D expenses.
Specifically, I predict that firms with higher levels of R&D expenses would experience
lower announcement abnormal returns relative to firms with lower levels of R&D
expenses, because low R&D firms are expected to benefit more from the higher reduction
in the diversification discount. To test this hypothesis, I regress the divesting parent‟s
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excess return at divestiture announcement on a set of explanatory variables, including an
interaction variable between the focus dummy and the high-R&D dummy. The average
market reaction is 2.9%, which is similar to 2.6% of Mulherin and Boone (200) or 3.4%
of Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003). The results in table 2.9 indicate that that the coefficient
on the interaction variable is significantly negative at the 10% level of confidence, which
supports Hypothesis 3. The finding suggests that the market reacts differently to firms
with different level of research and development expenses when the divestiture
announcement news is released.
D. Regression Analysis of the Factors that influence the Choices of Divestiture
Methods
I estimate logistic regressions to provide a robust analysis of the determinants on
the choice of divestiture method. I model the dependent variable as a binomial choice
variable of zero for equity carve-out transactions and of one for asset sell-off transactions.
I employ a logistic regression methodology and estimate the following model:
[1 if asset sell-off and 0 if equity carve-out]
= αi+ βilevel of focus factors
+ βirelatedness factors
+ βilevel of information asymmetry factors
+ βifirm characteristics + εi,
where the dependent variable equals one when the divestiture is an asset sell-off
and zero when it is an equity carve-out. The explanatory variables are discussed in part B
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of section II. The results are shown in table 2.10. I also include, but do not report, dummy
variables that control for the firm and industry fixed effects.
In model 1, the coefficient for the pre-divestiture parent firm‟s number of
business segments is positive and significantly different from zero, which suggests that
firms with a higher number of segments are more likely to divest through an asset selloff. This result supports Hypothesis 4, indicating that firms with a greater need for
increasing their focus are more likely to opt for a divestiture via a sell-off. In model 2, the
coefficient for the parent‟s pre-divestiture sales-based Herfindahl Index is positive and
statistically significant. The result remains the same when I use the asset-based
Herfindahl Index, consistent with Hypothesis 4. In model 3, the coefficient on the Relate2
variable is negative and significantly different from zero. Thus, this result suggests that
firms often divest a related unit via an equity care-out because there are synergies
between the parent and division when they are operating in the same industry, and those
synergies are better maintained with a carve-out where the parent still has a significant
relationship with its unit. The result does not change when I use Relate3 variable instead.
This finding also provides support for Hypothesis 4.
The findings also show that a firm‟s level of information asymmetry is positively
related to the likelihood that it will opt for the asset sell-off method over the equity carveout method when it divests. Specifically, models 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show these results,
which are consistent with Hypothesis 5. The coefficients on the degree of analyst
coverage and firm‟s size are both negative, while the coefficients on analyst earnings
forecast error, earning forecast dispersion, and intangible asset ratio are all positive, also
in support of Hypothesis 5. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant and only
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two coefficients on degree of analyst coverage and earnings forecast dispersion are
insignificantly different from zero. Perhaps the standard deviation of earnings forecast is
a good proxy for the consensus among analysts, but not for information asymmetry. For
example, low standard deviation of earnings forecast purely means high level of
consensus among analysts, but the earnings forecast error can still be either high or low,
which indicates either high or low level of informational asymmetry. In addition, the
number of analysts following the firm may be a good proxy for the supply of information
about the firm, but it can provide little information in case of a herding behavior in which
one analyst is making his estimation based on the estimation of another analyst.
Finally, the coefficients on the market value of divesting parents are always
negative and significantly different from zero in all models from 1 to 9. The results are
consistent with Hypothesis 5 which implies that public investors will find it easier to get
information of a big firm compared to a smaller one, and therefore, carve-out may be an
effective method.

In general, the results from my logistic regressions support the

hypotheses in section II for most proxies.
Model 10 captures the influence of R&D. While the results in previous models
suggest that firms with a higher number of segments are more likely to divest through an
asset sell-off, this finding does not hold for firms that invest significantly in research and
development. Surprisingly, for these types of firms, the likelihood for a firm to choose
the asset sell-off method is decreasing with its number of segments. A possible
explanation for this finding is that the division of an intensive R&D firm will benefit
through centralized R&D research. The higher the number of the firm‟s business
segments, the higher the total benefits of R&D inputs that are shared among its various
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segments. Thus, this type of firm is less vulnerable to the diversification discount and,
thus, benefits less from the increase in level of focus.
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5.

CONCLUSION

The sale of a subsidiary is a major corporate restructuring decision which may
help firms to improve operating efficiency, to increase cash flow, to expand production or
to reduce informational asymmetry. Prior studies typically report a positive cumulative
abnormal stock return around the announcement time for both equity carve-out and assets
sell-off parents. Yet, the post-divestiture long-term performance of the divesting parents
has received less scrutiny. In this paper, I examine the effect of the divestiture choice on
the long-run performance of the divesting parent firms as well as the underlying factors
that may influence this choice.
Examining a sample of 868 asset sell-off transactions and 162 equity carve-out
transactions between 1983 and 2005, I find that both long-term operating performance
and long-term abnormal stock returns are statistically higher for asset sell-off parents than
for equity carve-out parents. The finding is robust to different measurements of long-term
abnormal returns. I also find evidence that the difference in post-divestiture long-term
performance is affected by the reduction in the diversification discount. Firms that
increase their focus as results of their asset sales experience higher long-run stock returns
than firms that do not increase their focus.
I also document that the diversification discount may be less prevalent for certain
types of firms. In particular, the amount of diversification discount reduction depends on
the firm‟s level of R&D expenses because the diversification discount may be mitigated
by the benefit that each division receives from a central research and development
expenses. I find that the market reaction is stronger at divestiture announcement dates for

75

divesting parents with lower levels of R&D expenses. In addition, the results also
indicate that those firm experience higher long-run performance. The results imply that
the level of a firm‟s R&D is an important factor to consider when measuring the
diversification discount effect following a divestiture. Future research could explore other
firm characteristics that alleviate or even eliminate the diversification discount.
My empirical results further show that parent firms‟ number of segments, a proxy
for the firms‟ level of focus, is positively related to the probability of the asset sell-off
choice. In addition, firms with higher asymmetric information levels are more likely to
follow the sell-off option. The results also illustrate that when a firm divests an unrelated
unit, it more likely to choose the asset sell-off method, consistent with the long-run
findings.
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Table 2.1 Sample distributions by year and industry

Panel A: By year
Equity Carve-out

Asset sell-off

Year

N

Percent

Mean

Median

N

Percent

1983

10

6.2%

$174

$172

2

0.2%

1984

5

3.1%

$54

$43

5

0.6%

1985

3

1.9%

$671

$400

20

2.3%

1986

9

5.6%

$90

$88

16

1.8%

1987

9

5.6%

$411

$101

25

2.9%

1988

6

3.7%

$217

$205

25

2.9%

1989

4

2.5%

$348

$131

37

4.3%

1990

4

2.5%

$361

$221

22

2.5%

1991

6

3.7%

$363

$65

24

2.8%

1992

12

7.4%

$188

$105

25

2.9%

1993

11

6.8%

$662

$194

23

2.6%

1994

9

5.6%

$194

$70

26

3.0%

1995

7

4.3%

$314

$247

31

3.6%

1996

15

9.3%

$513

$243

40

4.6%

1997

8

4.9%

$296

$150

56

6.5%

1998

8

4.9%

$259

$315

53

6.1%

1999

12

7.4%

$698

$990

59

6.8%

2000

8

4.9%

$2,545

$2,841

78

9.0%

2001

8

4.9%

$626

$528

57

6.6%

2002

2

1.2%

$937

$937

52

6.0%

2003

1

0.6%

$1,583

$1,583

56

6.5%

2004

2

1.2%

$2,550

$2,550

66

7.6%

2005

3

1.9%

$1,021

$791

70

8.1%

Total

162

Mean

Median

$340

$300

$564

$760

$678

$360

$322

$641

$296

$476

$413

$370

$330

$390

$295

$458

$471

$560

$889

$1,100

$307

$177

$429

$409

$215

$130

$246

$569

$597

$385

$328

$430

$487

$600

$373

$558

$606

$650

$362

$362

$361

$361

$414

$414

$551

$407

$429

$472

868
$655

$564
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Panel B: By Industry
Industry

Equity Carve-out

Asset Sell-off

Total

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Food

5

3.1%

38

4.4%

43

4.2%

Mining and Minerals

3

1.9%

8

0.9%

11

1.1%

Oil and Petroleum

5

3.1%

41

4.7%

46

4.5%

Textiles and Apparel

2

1.2%

6

0.7%

8

0.8%

Consumer Durables

3

1.9%

15

1.7%

18

1.7%

Chemicals

5

3.1%

24

2.8%

29

2.8%

Drugs

9

5.6%

47

5.4%

56

5.4%

Construction

4

2.5%

15

1.7%

19

1.8%

Steel

2

1.2%

15

1.7%

17

1.7%

Fabricated Products

0

0.0%

5

0.6%

5

0.5%

Machinery

19

11.7%

98

11.3%

117

11.4%

Automobiles

6

3.7%

26

3.0%

32

3.1%

Transportation

8

4.9%

55

6.3%

63

6.1%

Utilities

7

4.3%

46

5.3%

53

5.1%

Retail Stores

11

6.8%

32

3.7%

43

4.2%

Finance

22

13.6%

147

16.9%

169

16.4%

Others

49

30.2%

248

28.6%

297

28.8%

Total

162

868

1030

The sample consists of transaction records of corporate divestiture via equity carve-out and asset sell-offs in the
period of 1983-2005. The numbers of divestiture transaction by year are presented in panel A. Panel B report the
distribution of divestiture transactions by industry. The total sample contains 162 equity carve-out and 868 asset
sell-offs. I report proceeds of carve-out transactions and consideration paid by the acquirer in asset sell-off
transactions. The Mean and Median columns report in millions of dollars.
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Table 2.2 Proportion of divested unit to the divesting parent

Asset Sell-off

Equity Carve-out

Year

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

1983

18.6%

33.6%

30.4%

14.0%

1984

12.3%

18.8%

15.1%

18.2%

1985

13.9%

23.3%

17.1%

21.0%

1986

22.5%

20.7%

38.0%

14.0%

1987

12.2%

14.5%

8.3%

14.1%

1988

10.9%

18.9%

13.7%

30.0%

1989

19.7%

13.0%

15.6%

51.9%

1990

19.7%

32.0%

14.1%

12.7%

1991

13.2%

18.3%

69.0%

14.5%

1992

25.4%

35.5%

42.3%

20.7%

1993

14.7%

26.7%

14.5%

16.1%

1994

25.9%

10.2%

10.4%

33.1%

1995

11.8%

21.1%

13.0%

54.2%

1996

11.8%

12.2%

12.7%

17.7%

1997

22.7%

21.6%

29.5%

24.3%

1998

12.5%

20.2%

28.6%

12.9%

1999

33.3%

19.9%

7.2%

13.5%

2000

9.5%

32.8%

41.7%

183.6%

2001

26.3%

16.5%

12.3%

14.7%

2002

7.0%

10.7%

18.9%

18.9%

2003

21.2%

11.5%

10.9%

96.4%

2004

21.8%

33.3%

6.6%

6.6%

2005

17.6%

21.2%

20.8%

11.9%

Total

18.6%

33.6%

21.3%

31.1%

This table reports the relative size between the divested unit and its parent. It is the average ratio of the sales price of
divested assets to the pre-deal total assets.
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics for divesting parents
The table provides the mean of accounting, financial, and other firm-specific variables that are supposed to have an
influence on the divestiture method for a sample of equity carve-outs (n=162) and a sample of asset sell-offs (n=
868). Variables are collected for each divesting parent at the fiscal year end proceeding the year in which the
transaction occurs. Number of segments is the total number of business lines reported by the firm which accounted
for at least 10% of the firm‟s sales. Relate2 and Relate3are dummy variables that take value of 1 when the firm and
its divested division are operating in the same business line (as categorized by the two and three digit SIC code) and
0 otherwise. Number of analyst coverage is measured as the mean number of analysts making one or two-year
earnings forecasts in any month of the year for each firm-calendar year. I define the analyst earnings forecast error
as the absolute value of the difference between the mean earnings estimate and the actual earnings scaled by the
price per share at the end of the month in which earnings information is released. I calculate analyst earnings
forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the end of the month
in which earnings information is released. Intangible assets ratio is computed as the firm‟s total intangibles assets
divided by the firm‟s total assets. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s book value of total assets at the end
of the previous fiscal year. Market to book is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the book
value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Operating
margin is measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) to book value of assets. R&D
ratio is the research and development expenses, scaled by book value of total assets. Relative size is the sales price
of divested assets to the pre-deal total assets. The mean values for the two groups of parent firms are reported in the
first two columns. The last column reports the two-sample t-test of the hypothesis that the means of the two groups
are equal. ***, **, and * indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a twotailed test.

84

Variables

Asset Sell-off Parents

Carve-out Parents

T-test

Number of business segments

2.95

2.48

2.38**

Sales-based Herfindahl Index

0.58

0.69

1.89*

Assets-based Herfindahl Index

0.59

0.68

1.77*

Relate2 (2 digit SIC code)

0.33

0.44

2.58***

Relate3 (3 digit SIC code)

0.22

0.3

1.96**

10

12

2.89 ***

Earnings forecast error

0.31

0.05

1.61***

Earnings forecast dispersion

3.8

0.86

1.88***

14.9%

8.9%

4.78***

Size

7.3

8.2

4.66***

Market to book

1.46

1.96

0.95

Leverage

0.66

0.65

1.12

Operating margin

6.8%

7.1%

0.82

R&D Ratio

2.4%

2.5%

0.67

Relative Size

18.6%

21.3%

0.92

Number of analyst coverage

Intangible assets ratio
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Table 2.4 Operating performance between divesting parents:
equity carve-out and asset sell-off

Operating Performance
(EBITDA/Total Assets)
Year of event

Asset Sell-off
Parents
0.07

Carve-out
Parents
0.07

Difference

T-test

0.00

0.82

Year 1

0.10

0.07

0.03

3.12 ***

Year 2

0.12

0.08

0.04

1.81 *

Year 3

0.12

0.09

0.03

3.69 ***

Industry adjusted – Year 0

0.005

0.006

0.00

0.07

Industry adjusted – Year 1

0.025

-0.015

0.04

3.55 ***

Industry adjusted – Year 2

0.031

0.00

0.031

2.28 **

Industry adjusted – Year 3

0.034

-0.015

0.05

4.21 ***

This table reports the averages of long-term operating performance of divesting parents in the year of the divestiture
events and over periods that extend from 1 to 3 years following the divestiture events. The operating performance is
measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) to book value of assets. ***, **, and *
indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 2.5 Long-run average excess returns of divesting firms
This table reports the long-term average excess return (AER) over periods that extend from 1 to 3 years following
the divestiture events. The excess return (ER) for each event firm is calculated in this table as:
ERi,a,b= ∏bt=a (Rit- Rm,t),
Where ERi,a,b represents the excess return for event firm i over the time period from month a to month b, Rit is the
return of event firm i on month t, and Rmt is the value weighted market return on month t. The post-announcement
long-term abnormal returns do not include the abnormal returns in month of the announcement date. The sample
consists of 868 asset sell-offs parent firms and 162 equity carve-out parent firms in the period from January 1983
through December 2005. The statistical significance of each of the AER is tested using the parametric t-test, based
on the cross-sectional standard deviations. The null hypothesis tested is that the estimate of AER is equal to zero.
***, **, and * indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.

Number
of obs
Carve-out

Asset selloff

Difference

162

868

Post-announcement Period
Statistic
year 1

year 2

year 3

3 years

AER(%)

-0.05

-0.05

-0.08

-0.18

t-statistic

[1.55]

[1.65]*

[1.75]*

[2.53]**

AER(%)

0.02

0.04

0.05

0.09

t-statistic

[1.2]

[2.81]***

[2.89]***

[3.98]***

Mean

0.07

0.09

0.13

0.27

t-test

[1.82]*

[2.67]***

[3.18]***

[3.67]***
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Table 2.6 Long-run buy-and-hold average abnormal returns of divesting firms using the
matching method
This table reports the long-term buy-and-hold average abnormal return (BHAAR) over holding periods that extend
from 1 to 4 years following the divestiture events, excluding the month of announcement date. The buy-and-hold
abnormal return (BHAR) for each event firm is calculated in this table as:
BHARi,a,b= ∏bt=a (Rit+ 1) - ∏bt=a (Rm,t +1),
where BHARi,a,b represents the excess return for event firm i over the time period from month a to month b, Rit is the
return of event firm i on month t, and Rmt is the return of the matched firm on month t. Matched firms are selected
using the following set of matching criteria : 1(year); (2) industry; (3) market-to-book; (4) size. The postannouncement long-term abnormal returns do not include the abnormal returns in month of the announcement date.
If an event firm is delisted before the end of a buy-and-hold period, its truncated return series is still included in the
analysis, and it is assumed to earn the monthly return of the bench mark for the remainder of the period. The sample
consists of 868 asset sell-offs parent firms and 163 equity car-out parent firms in the period from January 1983
through December 2005. The statistical significance of each of the BHAAR is tested using the parametric t-test,
based on the cross-sectional standard deviations. The null hypothesis tested is that the estimate of BHAAR is equal
to zero. ***, **, and * indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a twotailed test.

Number
of obs
Carve-out

Asset selloff

Difference

162

868

Post-announcement Buy-and-Hold Period
Statistic
1 year

2 years

3 years

4 years

BHAAR(%)

-0.03

-0.12

-0.14

-0.23

t-statistic

0.57

-1.21

-2.94***

-2.67***

BHAAR(%)

0.00

0.04

0.07

0.10

t-statistic

0.06

2.27**

2.04**

2.29**

Mean

0.02

0.16

0.21

0.33

t-test

1.19

1.81***

1.79***

2.02**
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Table 2.7
Long-run abnormal of divesting firms using the rolling portfolio method
This table reports the post announcement average abnormal monthly returns (αp), which are estimated using the
rolling portfolio method. For every month, the equally and valued weighted returns on the portfolio, which contains
all firms that sell-off or carve-out its segment during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months, not including
the month of announcement date, are estimated. Then, the calendar-time event-portfolio returns are used in the
following Fama and French (1993) three-factor plus momentum model to estimate the portfolio‟s abnormal returns:
Rp,t–Rf,t= αp + βp (Rm,t– Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpUMDt + ep,t,
where Rp,t represents the return on the event portfolio in the month t; Rf,t is the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill rate in
month t; Rm,t is the return on the equally-weighted index of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed stocks in month
t;SMBt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the NYSE median
value) with the same weighted average book-to-market value of equity ratio in month t; HMLt is the difference
between the returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market value of equity ratio (above and below the 0.7 and
0.3 fractiles) with about the same weighted average size in month t; and UMDt is the difference between the returns
on up and down return portfolio that mimics the momentum risk factor. The intercept α p is then interpreted as the
average monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across all 24, 36 or 48 months, as corresponds to the rolling
portfolio. Equally and valued weighted calendar-time portfolio returns are computed each month for all parents
firms that either had a carve-out or sold off its business segment in the previous 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. Since
the number of firms included in the rolling event portfolio changes over time, the weighted least squares (WLS)
estimates of the intercept αp are provided below. The weights used in the WLS model are equal to the number of
event firms in the monthly portfolio.Also, the value-weighted returns are computed using the market values of the
firms in the rolling portfolio as of the end of the month before the announcement date as the weighing vector. The
sample consists of 868 asset sell-offs parent firms and 162 equity carve-out parent firms in the period from January
1985 through December 2005. The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal monthly returns (α p) is
tested using the parametric t-test. The null hypothesis tested is that the estimate of αp is equal to zero. ***, **, and *
indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Post

Event

Announcement

Portfolio

Period

Return

Parent firms Sample
Statistic
Carve-out

Sell-off

Value

αp

-0.027

0.075

weighted

t-statistic

-0.64

4.49***

Equally

αp

-0.07

0.015

weighted

t-statistic

-1.96**

1.07

Value

αp

-0.09

0.16

weighted

t-statistic

-1.28

6.07***

Equally

αp

-0.06

0.047

weighted

t-statistic

-0.85

2.01**

Value

αp

0.25

0.24

weighted

t-statistic

2.89**

6.64***

Equally

αp

-0.11

0.07

weighted

t-statistic

-1.34

2.06**

Value

αp

0.26

0.31

weighted

t-statistic

2.46**

6.91***

Equally

αp

-0.09

0.09

weighted

t-statistic

-0.86

2.13**

1 year

2 years

3 years

4 years

Difference

0.1***

0.09**

0.25***

0.11**

-0.01

0.18**

0.05

0.18**
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Table 2.8
Post announcement long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns – Multivariate result
This table reports the regressions using as dependent variable, the long-run buy and hold abnormal return of carveout parents as well as that of asset sell-off parents. Sell-off is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
transaction is an asset sell-off and zero otherwise. Focus is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
divestiture transaction results in an increase in the parent firm‟s level of focus. R&D is a dummy variable that
indicates a firm with high level of research and development (R&D) expenses. Become acquirer is a dummy
variable that take the value of one if the divesting parent becomes an acquirer within one after the divestiture and
zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in previous tables. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Variables
Sell-off

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.22

0.24

[0.08]*

[0.08]*

0.14
[0.03]**

Focus

Focus * R&D

-0.12
[0.10]*

Become acquirer

-0.17

-0.27

-0.19

[0.62]

[0.54]

[0.64]

0.01

-0.14

0.16

[0.98]

[0.77]

[0.6]

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

[0.50]

[0.58]

[0.34]

0.53

0.59

0.12

[0.31]

[0.26]

[0.92]

0.008

0.002

-0.01

[0.89]

[0.97]

[0.38]

1.3

1.26

0.25

[0.19]

[0.27]

[0.42]

0.75

1.2

0.18

[0.60]

[0.65]

[0.94]

0.009

0.006

0.001

[0.67]

[0.15]

[0.42]

R-Square

0.08

0.08

0.02

No of obs

1030

1030

267

Relative Size

MTB

Lev

Size

FE

DISPER

INTAN_R
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Table 2.9
Divestiture announcement abnormal returns - Multivariate result
In this table, the dependent variable is the announcement excess return during the [-1, +1] window. Focus is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the divestiture transaction results in an increase in the parent firm‟s
level of focus. R&D is a dummy variable that indicates a firm with high level of research and development (R&D)
expenses. Other variables are defined in previous tables. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Variables

Excess Return

Focus

0.027
[0.06]*

Focus * R&D

-0.01
[0.1]*

Relative Size

0.001
[1.22]

Market to Book

-0.005
[0.67]

Leverage

0.01
[0.75]

Size

0.003
[1.35]

Analyst earnings forecast error

0.008
[1.95]*

Analyst earnings forecast dispersion

0.06
[1.25]

Intangible Assets/ Total Assets

0.005
[0.18]

R-Square

0.04

No of obs

313
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Table 2.10
Logistic regression of factors influencing divestiture choice
In this table, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the observation is an asset sell-off, and
takes value of zero if it is an equity carve-out. Year 0 represents the year in which the transaction occurs. I measure
all the independent variables in the year -1. Market value of equity is retrieved from CRSP. H_INDEX_S is a salesbased Herfindahl Index across the firm‟s business segments while H_INDEX_A is an assets-based Herfindahl Index
across the firm‟s business segments. N_SEG is the total number of business lines reported by the firm which
accounted for at least 10% of the firm‟s sales. Relate2 and Relate3 are dummy variables that take value of 1 when
the firm and its divested division are operating in the same business line (as categorized by the two and three digit
SIC code) and 0 otherwise. N_ALYS is the mean number of analysts making one or two-year earnings forecasts in
any month of the year for each firm-calendar year. I define the analyst earnings forecast error FE as the absolute
value of the difference between the mean earnings estimate and the actual earnings scaled by the price per share at
the end of the month in which earnings information is released. I calculate analyst earnings forecast dispersion
DISPER as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the end of the month in which
earnings information is released. Intangible assets ratio (INTAN_R) is computed as the firm‟s total intangibles
assets divided by the firm‟s total assets. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s book value of total assets at
the end of the previous fiscal year. Market to book is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. Leverage is
the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. R&D
is a dummy variable that indicates a firm with high level of research and development (R&D) expenses. I include,
but not report, industry and year dummies in the regressions (1) – (10). P-values are reported in the brackets. ***,
**, and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Variables

(1)

N_SEG

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.21

0.27

0.21

0.16

[0.02]**

[0.01]***

[0.09]*

[0.04]**

N_SEG*R&D

-0.15
[0.08]*

H_INDEX_S

-0.02
[0.10] *

RELATE2

-0.39

-0.22

-0.22

[0.04]**

[0.43]

[0.47]

N_ALYS

-0.01
[0.93]

FE

1.42

2.1

[0.10]*

[0.17]

DISPER

0.07

0.73

[0.17]

[0.82]

INTAN_R

SIZE

MTB

LEV

No of Obs

0.02

0.03

0.02

[0.00]***

[0.01]***

[0.03]**

-0.4

-0.3

-0.27

-0.25

-0.29

-0.27

-0.26

-0.41

-0.52

-041

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

[0.00]***

0.007

0.007

0.01

0.006

0.007

0.008

0.02

0.02

0.006

0.007

[0.57]

[0.58]

[0.55]

[0.76]

[0.73]

[0.7]

[0.37]

[0.49]

[0.81]

[0.63]

0.03

-0.2

-0.27

-0.1

0.42

0.37

-0.26

0.07

0.46

-0.14

[0.93]

[0.65]

[0.48]

[0.82]

[0.41]

[0.47]

[0.55]

[0.88]

[0.51]

[0.45]

535

548

887

814

767

730

749

463

369

456
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